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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON ENDOGENOUS TIME PREFERENCE and STRATEGIC
INTERACTION
TURAN, Agah Reha
P.D., Department of Economics
Supervisor: Assis. Prof. Dr. Ça¼gr¬Sa¼glam
September 2013
This thesis includes three self contained essays on the existence and qualitative
properties of equilibrium dynamics under endogenous time preference. In the rst
essay, we reconsider the optimal growth model proposed by Stern (2006). We prove
the almost everywhere di¤erentiability of the value function and uniqueness of the
optimal path, which were left as open questions and show how a small perturbation
to the price of future oriented capital qualitatively changes the equilibrium dynamics.
Almost none of the studies on endogenous time preference consider the strategic inter-
action among the agents. In the second essay, by considering a strategic growth model
with endogenous time preference, we provide the su¢ cient conditions of supermodu-
larity for dynamic games with open-loop strategies and show that the stationary state
iii
Nash equilibria tend to be symmetric. We numerically show that the initially rich can
pull the poor out of poverty trap even when sustaining a higher level of steady state
capital stock for itself. Lastly, in the third essay, we consider the socially determined
time preference which depends on the level of sh stock and characterize the basic
shery model under this setup. We provide existence of collusive and open-loop Nash
equilibria and compare the e¢ ciency and qualitative properties of them.
Keywords: Endogenous Time Preference, Supermodular Games, Lattice Program-
ming, Dynamic Resource Games
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ÖZET
ENDOJEN ZAMAN TERC·IH·I ve STRATEJ·IK ETK·ILES¸·IM ÜZER·INE
MAKALELER
TURAN, Agah Reha
Doktora, Ekonomi Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Ça¼gr¬Sa¼glam
September 2013
Bu tez endojen zaman tercihi modellerinde denge dinamiklerinin varl¬¼g¬ve özellik-
lerinin çal¬¸s¬ld¬¼g¬üç ayr¬makale içermektedir. ·Ilk makalede, Stern (2006) taraf¬ndan
ortaya konan optimal büyüme modeli yeniden ele al¬narak, bu makalede cevaplanmak
üzere b¬rak¬lan de¼ger fonksiyonun hemen her yerde türevinin al¬nabilirli¼gi ve optimal
yolun hemen her yerde tek olmas¬hususlar¬ispat edilmi¸stir. Ayr¬ca, gelece¼ge odakl¬
sermayenin yat¬ndaki küçük de¼gi¸sikliklerin denge dinamikleri üzerindeki niteliksel
etkisi gösterilmi¸stir.
v
Zaman tercihinin endojen oldu¼gu çal¬¸smalar¬n hemen hemen hiçbirinde aktörler
aras¬ndaki stratejik etkiles¸im göz önüne al¬nmamaktad¬r. ·Ikinci makalede, endo-
jen zaman tercihli stratejik büyüme modeli alt¬nda, aktörlerin birbirlerinin strate-
jilerine kendi stratejilerini art¬rarak cevap verdikleri Süpermoduler Oyunlar¬n aç¬k
döngülü bilgi yap¬s¬ alt¬nda yeter s¸artlar¬ ortaya konmus¸, bu oyun yap¬s¬ alt¬nda
bas¸lang¬ç s¸artlar¬ndaki farkl¬l¬klar¬n uzun dönem içerisinde ortadan kayboldu¼gu is-
patlanm¬¸st¬r. Ayr¬ca, say¬sal olarak, tek bas¸¬na ele al¬nd¬klar¬nda yoksulluk kapan¬na
tak¬lacak aktörlerin, bas¸lang¬ç kos¸ullar¬aç¬s¬ndan daha zengin bir aktörle stratejik etk-
iles¸ime girdiklerinde bu kapandan kurtulabildikleri gösterilmi¸stir. Son olarak, üçüncü
makalede mülkiyet haklar¬n¬n tan¬ml¬ olmad¬¼g¬bir ortamda, aktörlerin zaman ter-
cihlerinin ekonomideki kaynaklarla belirlendi¼gi durumda i¸sbirli¼gi dengesinin ve aç¬k
döngülü bilgi yap¬s¬alt¬nda i¸sbirli¼ginin olmad¬¼g¬Nash dengesinin varl¬¼g¬gösterilmi¸s,
bu Nash dengesinin etkinli¼gi ve i¸sbirli¼gi dengesinden niteliksel farkl¬l¬klar¬ incelen-
mi¸stir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Endojen Zaman Tercihi, Süpermoduler Oyunlar, Latis Pro-
gramlama, Dinamik Kaynak Oyunlar¬
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Poverty trap is a selfperpetuating condition where poverty is its own cause. Many
di¤erent feedback mechanisms from demography to the lack of nancial development,
from the non-convexities in technology caused by externalities and xed costs to social
norms are highlighted as the sources of the vicious cycle that an economy is trapped
in. (For an recent survey, see Azariadis and Stachurski, 2005.)
The main message of the poverty trap literature is that a long term performance
of an economy may depend on initial conditions, by suggesting that long run per-
formance of an economy could be much better if its initial condition were better.
(Matsuyama, 2008) Having said that initial conditions are not the only factor be-
hind cross country income di¤erences, in this literature it is demonstrated that the
initially underendowed economies may lag permanently behind the otherwise identi-
cal economies. The dependence on initial conditions are shown by the emergence of
threshold dynamics according to which the economies with low initial capital stock or
income converge to a steady state with low per capita income, while economies with
high initial capital stock or income converge to a steady state with high per capita
income.
1
A general tendency in these studies is assuming that an agents period utility
is discounted with a constant rate. In this thesis, we depart from this assumption
and study the implications of endogenous time preference on threshold dynamics.
Following the empirically supported assumption (see Lawrence, 1991, and Samwick,
1998) in recent theoretical studies we let the rate of time preference decrease with the
level of wealth, i.e., the rich are more patient than the poor. We assume rst that an
economy admits a representative household (chapter 2) and study the implications
of the endogenous time preference on equilibrium dynamics. Then we analyze how
the results under representative agent framework would change, if we consider the
conicting interests of the agents (chapter 3 and 4).
Imperfect ability of people to imagine the future can be ameliorated by spending
resources. These resources range from time and e¤orts that increase the anticipation
of future to goods that support or enforce considering future benets. This idea has
been formally introduced by Becker and Mulligan (1997) in a nite horizon model
where the discount function depends on allocated resources called "future oriented
capital". Stern (2006) uses this idea under the classic optimal growth model and
provides numerical examples in which multiple steady states and a conditionally sus-
tained growth path may occur.
In chapter two, we extend the analysis provided by Stern (2006). Sterns e¤ort
to adapt the classical optimal growth framework to include endogenous discounting
provides us a more exible framework regarding the discounting of time, while main-
taining time consistency. For that reason it is important to provide a comprehensive
analysis of this model.
In a standard optimal growth model with geometric discounting and the usual
concavity assumptions on preferences and technology, the optimal policy correspon-
dence is single valued and the properties of the optimal path are easily found by using
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the rst order conditions together with envelope theorem by di¤erentiating the value
function. However, in endogenous discounting models, the objective function includes
multiplication of a discount function which generally destroys the concavity of value
function. Under non-convex technology, Amir, Mirman, and Perkins (1991) were able
to deal with this situation by employing lattice programming techniques. By nding
a partial order that will turn budget sets into lattice spaces, Stern (2006) utilizes this
technique to show monotonicity and convergence result of any optimal path.
We prove the convergence of the optimal path of future oriented capital and con-
sumption rather than just the optimal path of capital and provide conditions under
which the system does not converge to zero. Moreover, we prove the almost every-
where di¤erentiability of the value function, and the almost everywhere uniqueness
of the optimal path, which were left as open questions in Stern (2006).
The price of the future oriented capital is assumed to be constant in Becker and
Mulligan (1997) and Stern (2006) transferred it into the optimal growth model by
dening a parameter, that merely act as a price that converts future oriented capital
stock to the units of consumption and capital goods. Since the resources to increase
appreciation of the future cannot be used in production, any factors related to either
the cost of producing future oriented capital or e¢ ciency in it a¤ect this parameter.
However, the implications of this parameter on the dynamic behavior of the system
are left unexplored.
We show how a small perturbation to the price of future oriented capital qual-
itatively changes the equilibrium dynamics. We demonstrate the occurrence of a
saddle-node bifurcation with respect to the price of future oriented capital stock. By
using the same functional forms and the parameter set as Stern (2006) did while giving
an example to multiple steady states and divergence, we show that only by changing
the value of cost of future oriented capital, one can also obtain global convergence.
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There are cases such that more than one player can and does manipulate the
system for his own benet, their interests dont always coincide and no single player
has an exclusive control over the turn of events (Clemhout & Wan, 1979). In such
cases, one decision maker assumption as a rst approximation to reality may not be
applicable i.e. the analyses assuming that the agents are isolated may not be robust
to the considerations of strategic interactions among agents in the economy.
In Chapter three, in line with the Erol et. al. (2011) we let the discount factor
be increasing in the stock of wealth and analyze to what extent the strategic comple-
mentarity inherent in agentsstrategies can alter the non-convergence results being
found under a single agent optimal growth model.
We adopt the non-cooperative open loop Nash equilibrium concept, in which
players choose their strategies as simple time functions and they are able to com-
mit themselves to time paths as equilibrium strategies. In this setup, agents choose
their strategies simultaneously and face with a single criterion optimization problem
constrained by the strategies of the rival taken as given. We focus on the qualita-
tive properties of the open-loop Nash equilibria and the dynamic implications of the
strategic interaction.
Due to the potential lack of both concavity and the di¤erentiability of the value
functions associated with each agents problem, topological arguments cannot be used
while proving the existence of Nash equilibria and characterizing their properties.
Instead, we employ the theory of monotone comparative statics and the supermodular
games based on order and monotonicity properties on lattices (see Topkis, 1998).
In this chapter, we rst provide the su¢ cient conditions of supermodularity for
dynamic games with open-loop strategies based on two fundamental elements: the
ability to order elements in the strategy space of the agents and the strategic com-
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plementarity which implies upward sloping best responses. The supermodular game
structure in our model enables us provide the existence and the monotonicity re-
sults on the greatest and the least equilibria. We sharpen these results by showing
the di¤erentiability of the value function and the uniqueness of the best response
correspondences almost everywhere.
The supermodular games are characterized with a specic property: as one player
selects higher strategies, the other players do as well. Hence interactions dominated
by complementarities provide agents with an incentive to follow the behavior of the
others. The key feature of our analysis is that under strategic complementarities, the
initial di¤erences tend to vanish and the stationary state Nash equilibria tend to be
symmetric under open-loop strategies. We show that the initially rich can pull the
poor out of poverty trap even when sustaining a higher level of steady state capital
stock for itself.
In chapter four, we consider the hypothesis that while the time preference is one
of the major factors on allocation of the resources, these resources can also a¤ect the
societys time preference.
There is a new but growing literature considering the dependence of time prefer-
ence to the aggregate variables while studying extinction and exploitation of renewable
resources. However, none of these studies investigate the implications of endogenous
discounting under strategic interaction.
The shery model has been used as a metaphor for any kind of renewable resource
on which the property rights are not well dened. (see Long, 2010, for a comprehensive
survey) In these models, the set of feasible strategies available to the players are
interdependent and in addition, the agentschoices in the current period a¤ect the
payo¤s and their choice sets in the future. We let the socially determined time
5
preference depend on the level of resource stock and characterize the basic shery
model.
By using a discrete time formulation, we study the existence and the e¢ ciency of
the open loop Nash equilibrium (OLNE). We show rst that unlike constant discount-
ing, we cannot rely on symmetric social planner problem while showing the existence
and the qualitative properties of Nash equilibrium. Instead, we use a topological xed
point theorem to show existence of OLNE.
We prove that OLNE may result in overexploitation or under exploitation of
the resources relative to e¢ cient solution depending on the return is bounded or
unbounded from below.
The OLNE di¤ers from the collusive equilibria in terms of not only e¢ ciency
but also equilibrium dynamics. We show that open loop information structure can
remove indeterminacy that we may face under collusive equilibrium and be a source
of multiplicity despite the uniqueness we may face under collusive equilibrium.
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CHAPTER 2
SADDLE-NODE BIFURCATION IN OPTIMAL GROWTH MODELS
A LA BECKER-MULLIGAN
Based on the following observations, Becker & Mulligan (1997) formally intro-
duced a nite horizon model where the discount function depends on allocated re-
sources which they called "future oriented capital".
 People are not all equally patient.
 Many of the di¤erences among people are explainable: Patience seems to be
associated with income, development, and education.
 Heavy discounting of the future is viewed by many people to be inappropriate,
undesirable, or even "irrational".
 People are often aware of their weaknesses and may spend resources to overcome
them. These resources could be time and e¤orts that increase the anticipation
of future or goods that support or enforce considering future benets.
Stern (2006) use this idea under the classic optimal growth model by providing
two interpretations:
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 (A dynasty) The discount factor is the degree of intergenerational altruism: The
future oriented capital stock represents actions that the parent could take in
order to strengthen the relationship with his child.
 (Single individual with an innite lifetime) The discount factor represents the
degree to which the individual appreciates future utility when making current
decisions: Education, religion, self-discipline as well as time spent on imagining
future utilities can e¤ect discount factor.
The price of the future oriented capital is assumed to be constant in Becker and
Mulligan (1997). Stern (2006) transferred it into the optimal growth model by den-
ing a parameter, that merely act as a price that converts future oriented capital stock
to the units of consumption and capital goods. Since the resources to increase ap-
preciation of the future cannot be used in production, any factors related to either
the cost of producing future oriented capital or e¢ ciency in it a¤ect this parameter.
However, the implications of this parameter on the dynamic behavior of the system
are left unexplored.
We show how a small perturbation to the price of future oriented capital quali-
tatively changes the equilibrium dynamics. In particular, we demonstrate the occur-
rence of a saddle-node bifurcation with respect to the price of future oriented capital
stock. We use the same functional forms and the parameter set as Stern (2006) did
while giving an example for the multiple steady states and divergence and show that,
with the same functional forms, only by changing the value of cost of future oriented
capital, one can also obtain global convergence.
Sterns e¤ort to adapt the classical optimal growth framework to include endoge-
nous discounting provide us a more exible framework in regards to the discounting of
time, while maintaining time consistency. For that reason it is important to provide
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a comprehensive analysis of this model. We contribute to this e¤ort by proving the
almost everywhere di¤erentiability of the value function, and the almost everywhere
uniqueness of the optimal path, which were left as open questions in Stern (2006).
The monotonicity and convergence results of any optimal path of capital are avail-
able in Stern (2006). We prove the convergence of the optimal path of future oriented
capital and consumption rather than just the optimal path of capital and provide
conditions under which the system does not converge to zero.
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model and
provides the dynamic properties of optimal paths. Section 3 discusses the relation
between the relative cost of future oriented capital and the long run equilibrium.
2.1 The Model
The model di¤ers from the classic optimal growth model by the assumption on dis-
counting. We assume that the discount rate depends on the future oriented capital
stock. The amount of resources allocated to increase the appreciation of the future
in period t will be denoted with the control variable st: The discount on the future in
period t will be a real valued function  of st:We assume that st will cost the planner
an amount st in terms of current resources. The parameter  merely acts as a price
that converts future oriented capital stock to the units of consumption and capital
goods. Since the resources to increase appreciation of the future cannot be used in
production, it is strictly positive. Any factors related to either the cost of producing
future oriented capital or e¢ ciency in it a¤ect this parameter.
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Formally, the model is stated as follows:
max
fct+1;st+1g1t=0
1X
t=1
 
t 1Y
r=1
(sr)
!
u(ct); (1)
subject to
8t; ct+1 + xt+1 + st+1  f(xt); (2)
8t; ct+1  0; xt+1  0; st+1  0;
x0  0; given.
We make the following assumptions regarding the properties of the discount, utility
and the production functions.
Assumption 2.1 u : R+ ! R+ is a continuously di¤erentiable, strictly concave,
strictly increasing function that satises u(0) = 0 and the Inada condition u0(0) =1.
Assumption 2.2 f : R+ ! R+is a continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing
function that satises f(0) = 0: Moreover there exists xm such that f(x) < x for any
x > xm.
Assumption 2.3  : R+ ! R++ is a continuously di¤erentiable, concave, strictly
increasing function satisfying (xm

) < 1; (0) = 0 and 0(0) = +1.
Assumption 2.4  2 R++.
Stern (2006) assumes the complete depreciation of the future oriented capital
stock. This assumption allows us to represent future oriented capital stock with a
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control variable instead of additional state variable and remove the additional com-
plexity the latter would bring. This assumption is more in line with the dynastic fam-
ily interpretation than with the innitely-lived single individual interpretation where
st can be viewed as a parental investment in the relationship with child. Strictly
increasingness of the discount function assures that the more future oriented capital
stock we allocate the greater current appreciation of the future we have and concavity
of it promises a diminishing return to investment in st.
2.2 Existence of Optimal Paths, Euler Equations
For any level of total capital k;
(k) := f(c; s; x) : c+ s+ x  f(k); c  0; s  0; x  0g
For any initial level of total capital x0  0, we say that (c; s;x) = (x0; c1; s1; x1; :::) is
feasible from x0; if (ct+1; st+1; xt+1) 2 (xt); for all t:We denote the set of all feasible
sequences from x0;by (x0) : For a feasible sequence (c; s;x) from x0; we denote the
total discounted utility by
U (c; s;x) :=
1X
t=1
 
t 1Y
r=1
(sr)
!
u(ct):
We say that (c; s;x) is an optimal path from x0, if (c; s; x) 2 (x0) and U(c; s; x) 
U(c0; s0; x0) for any (c0; s0;x0) 2 (x0) : Due to the existence of a maximum level of
sustainable capital stock, any feasible capital path x is bounded from above by a
nite number A(x0) depending on the initial capital x0. Therefore (x0) is compact
and the continuous function U attains its maximum on (x0) at the optimal path.
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Let the maximum value of U on (x0) be called V (x0); where V indeed denotes
the value function. Formally
V (x0) := max fU (c; s;x) : (c; s;x) 2 (x0)g :
The following proposition yields some important properties of the optimal paths.
Proposition 2.1 If (c; s;x) is an optimal path from x0; Then
(i)
ct+1 + st+1 + xt+1 = f(xt);8t: (3)
Also, if x0 > 0;
(ii)
ct+1 > 0; st+1 > 0; xt+1 > 0; 8t: (4)
and
(iii) (Euler-1)
u0(ct+1) = 
0(st+1)V (xt+1);8t: (5)
(iv) (Euler-2)
u0(ct+1) = (st+1)f 0(xt+1)u0(ct+2); 8t: (6)
Proof. (i) Easily follows from the fact that u is increasing.
(ii) First, we will prove that for any t, xt > 0: Assume the contrary. Take the
smallest t such that xt = 0 and call it n: Since x0 > 0; we have xn 1 > 0 for
any value of n. This implies that sn 1 > 0 along the optimal path. Moreover
xn = 0 assures that sn = 0 for an optimal path. Hence cn = fn 1(xn 1): Consider
12
x0 such that x0n = "; c
0
n = fn 1(xn 1)   2"; s0n = "; for a su¢ ciently small "; and
xt = x
0
t; ct = c
0
t; st = s
0
t; 8t 6= n:
We have,
U (c0; s0;x0)  U (c; s;x) =
 
n 1Y
r=1
(sr)
!
(u(cn   2") + ( "

)V (")  u(cn)):
From Inada Condition on , for su¢ ciently small "; U (c0; s0;x0)   U (c; s;x) > 0;
which contradicts the optimality of x: Hence, xt > 0, 8t:
Since xt > 0 and (0) = 0, we have st > 0;8t:
Now, we will prove that ct > 0;8t: Assume the contrary. Clearly zero consumption
path after some period can never be optimal, because xt > 0; 8t: Hence, there exists
n such that cn = 0; cn+1 > 0: Consider s0such that s0n = sn  " ; for a su¢ ciently small
"; and st = s0t; 8t 6= n: Let c0n = "; ct = c0t; 8t 6= n; t 6= n+ 1:
Then, we have:
U (c0; s0;x0)  U (c; s;x) =
 
n 1Y
r=1
(sr)
!h
u(") + (sn   "

)V (x)  (sn)V (x)
i
:
From Inada condition on u, along with assumptions on u; f; ; for su¢ ciently small
"; above expression becomes positive, leading to a contradiction.
(iii) Fix any n: For a su¢ ciently small " 2 R; construct (c"; s";x") as follows:
c"n+1 = cn+1   "; c"t+1 = ct+1 8t 6= n;
s"n+1 = sn+1 +
"

; s"t+1 = st+1 8t 6= n;
x"t+1 = xt+1 8t:
Feasibility of (c"; s";x") is a result of (ii). Since (c; s;x) is optimal, we have
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U (c; s;x)  U (c"; s";x") ; 8":
U (c; s;x) =
nX
t=1
 
t 1Y
r=1
(sr)
!
u(ct) +
1X
t=n+1
 
t 1Y
r=1
(sr)
!
u(ct)
=
nX
t=1
 
t 1Y
r=1
(sr)
!
u(ct)
+
"
nY
r=1
(sr)
#"
u(cn+1) + (sn+1)
1X
t=n+2
 1Y
r=n+2
(sr)
!
u(ct)
#
=
nX
t=1
 
t 1Y
r=1
(sr)
!
u(ct) +
"
nY
r=1
(sr)
#
[u(cn+1) + (sn+1)V (xn+1)]
 U (c"; s";x")
=
nX
t=1
 
t 1Y
r=1
(sr)
!
u(ct) +
"
nY
i=1
(sr)
# h
u(cn+1   ") + (sn+1 + "

)V (xn+1)
i
Dene $1(") := u(cn+1   ") + (sn+1 + " )V (xn+1): Then,
$1(0) = u(cn+1)+(sn+1)V (xn+1)  u(cn+1  ")+(sn+1+ "

)V (xn+1) = $1("); 8";
which implies that $01(0) = 0: Hence u
0(cn+1) = 
0(sn+1)V (xn+1):
(iv) Similarly, x any n: For a su¢ ciently small " 2 R; construct (c"; s";x") as
follows:
c"n+1 = cn+1 "; c"n+2 = cn+2+f(xn+1+") f(xn+1); c"t+1 = ct+1 8t 6= n; n+1;
s"t+1 = st+1 8t;
x"n+1 = xn+1 + "; x
"
t+1 = xt+1 8t 6= n:
Feasibility of (c"; s";x") is a result of (ii). Since (c; s;x) is optimal, we have
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U (c; s;x)  U (c"; s";x") ; 8":
U (c; s;x) =
nX
t=1
 
t 1Y
r=1
(sr)
!
u(ct) +
1X
t=n+3
 
t 1Y
r=1
(sr)
!
u(ct)
+
 
nY
r=1
(sir)
!
[u(cn+1) + (sn+1)u(cn+2)]
 U (c"; s";x") =
nX
t=1
 
t 1Y
r=1
(sr)
!
u(ct) +
1X
t=n+3
 
t 1Y
r=1
(sr)
!
u(ct)
+
 
nY
i=1
(s)
!
[u(cn+1   ") + (sn+1)u(cn+2 + f(xn+1 + ")  f(xn+1))]
Dene $2(") := u(cn+1   ") + (sn+1)u(cn+2 + f(xn+1 + ")  f(xn+1)): Then,
$2(0) = u(cn+1) + (sn+1)u(cn+2) 
u(cn+1   ") + (sn+1)u(cn+2 + f(xn+1 + ")  f(xn+1)) = $2("); 8";
which implies that $02(0) = 0: Hence u
0(cn+1) = (sn+1)f 0(xn+1)u0(cn+2):
Consider 5. Note that u0 and 0 are decreasing functions. By (3), ct+1 = f(xt) 
xt+1  st+1: Given xt and xt+1; u0(f(xt)  xt+1  st+1) increases as we invest more on
future-oriented capital st+1. On the other hand, 
0(st+1) decreases as we do so. Thus,
5 precisely yields the unique st+1; given xt and xt+1. In other words, it allows us to
decide how much to share between todays consumption ct+1 and the future-oriented
capital st+1, given the path of the capital. Moreover, 6 gives the intertemporal ow
of the path.
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2.3 Value Function, Bellman Equation, Optimal Policy
We have already dened the value function. Its well dened, non-negative, con-
tinuous and strictly increasing. As the recursive structure of the standard optimal
growth models is preserved by our model, the satisfaction of Bellmans equation is
also straightforward (See Stokey and Lucas, 1989 and Le Van and Dana, 2003):
V (xt) = maxfxt+1g1t=0
fu(f(xt)  xt+1   st+1) + (st+1)V (xt+1)g
The optimal policy correspondance,  : R+ ! R+; is dened as follows:
 (k) := arg max
(c;s;x)
8><>: u(c) + (s)V (x)j c+ s+ x 2 (k)
9>=>; : (7)
Note that, from (3), we can equivalently dene the optimal policy correspondence
as
 (k) := arg max
(c;s;x)
8><>: u(c) + (s)V (x) j c+ s+ x= f(k); c  0; s  0; x  0
9>=>; :
The non-emptiness, upper semi continuity and compact valuedness of the optimal
policy correspondence and its equivalance with the optimal path follow easily from
the continuity of the value function by a standard application of the theorem of the
maximum (see Stern, 2006 and Le Van and Dana, 2003).
In a standard optimal growth model with geometric discounting and the usual
concavity assumptions on preferences and technology, the optimal policy correspon-
dence is single valued and the properties of the optimal path is easily found by using
the rst order conditions together with envelope theorem by di¤erentiating the value
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function. However, in our model, the objective function includes multiplication of
a discount function. This generally destroys the usual concavity argument which is
used in the proof of the di¤erentiability of value function and the uniqueness of the
optimal paths (see Benveniste and Scheinkman, 1979; Araujo, 1991).
At this point, we need to refer to an important theorem in Stern (2006), concerning
the increasingness of the optimal policy correspondence.
Theorem 2.1 (Thm 3.7, Stern 2006)  is increasing, i.e. if k0  k; (c0; s0; x0) 2
(k0); (c; s; x) 2 (k); then s0 + x0  s+ x and x0  x:
Indeed, the increasingness of the optimal policy correspondence allows us to claim
the monotonicity of the optimal paths, which is crucial in analyzing the dynamic
properties of the model.
Bringing together the increasingness and the upper semi-continuity of ; we will
prove that the left and right derivatives of the value function exists, using the methods
in Le Van and Dana (2003). Let (k) := min fs+ x : (f(k)  x  s; s; x) 2 (k)g
and  (k) := max fs+ x : (f(k)  x  s; s; x) 2 (k)g :
Proposition 2.2 (i) Left derivative of V exits at every x0 > 0, precisely V 0 (x0) =
u0(f(x0)  (x0))f 0(x0):
(ii)Right derivative of V exists at every x0 > 0; precisely V 0+(x0) = u
0(f(x0)  
 (x0))f
0(x0):
Proof. (i) Take a sequence of initial capitals xn0 converging to x0 from below. For-
mally, xn0 ! x0; xn0 < x0: Let (c1; s1; x1) 2 (x0) be such that s1 + x1 = (x0):
Take (cn1 ; s
n
1 ; x
n
1 ) 2 (xn0 ) for each n: Since xn0 < x0; increasingness of  implies that
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xn1 < x1 and x
n
1 + s
n
1 < x1 + s1: By (4), x1 + s1 < f(x0): Now recall that x
n
0 ! x0;
hence f(xn0 )! f(x0): Then for all n large enough, we have x1+s1 < f(xn0 ) < f(x0):
Bringing together all, we have xn1 + s
n
1 < x1 + s1 < f(x
n
0 ) < f(x0): Particularly,
x1 + s1 < f(x
n
0 ) and x
n
1 + s
n
1 < f(x0): This means that:
(f(xn0 )  s1   x1; s1; x1) 2 (xn0 ); (8)
(f(x0)  sn1   xn1 ; sn1 ; xn1 ) 2 (x0): (9)
By (8), we know that (f(xn0   s1  x1); s1; x1) is feasible after xn0 but it need not
be optimal. Hence we have:
V (xn0 )  u(f(xn0 )  s1   x1) + (s1)V (x1): (10)
Also note that:
V (x0) = u(f(x0)  s1   x1) + (s1)V (x1): (11)
Subtracting (10) from (11), and employing the concavity of u; we obtain:
V (x0)  V (xn0 )  u(f(x0)  s1   x1)  u(f(xn0 )  s1   x1)
 u0(f(xn0 )  s1   x1) [f(x0)  f(xn0 )] :
Therefore:
V (x0)  V (xn0 )
x0   xn0
 u0(f(xn0 )  s1   x1)
f(x0)  f(xn0 )
x0   xn0
:
Taking the limit as xn0 ! x0 :
lim sup
xn0!x0
V (x0)  V (xn0 )
x0   xn0
 u0(f(x0) s1 x1)f 0(x0) = u0(f(x0) (x0))f 0(x0): (12)
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By (9), similarly, (f(x0)  sn1   xn1 ; sn1 ; xn1 ) is feasible after x0:Hence:
V (x0)  u(f(x0)  sn1   xn1 ) + (sn1 )V (xn1 ): (13)
Also:
V (xn0 ) = u(f(x
n
0 )  sn1   xn1 ) + (sn1 )V (xn1 ): (14)
Subtracting (14) from (13), and employing the concavity of u; we obtain:
V (x0)  V (xn0 )  u(f(x0)  sn1   xn1 )  u(f(xn0 )  sn1   xn1 )
 u0(f(x0)  sn1   xn1 ) [f(x0)  f(xn0 )] :
Therefore:
V (x0)  V (xn0 )
x0   xn0
 u0(f(x0)  sn1   xn1 )
f(x0)  f(xn0 )
x0   xn0
:
Now recall that  is upper semi-continuous. Then we may assume (cn1 ; s
n
1 ; x
n
1 ) con-
verges to some (c01; s
0
1; x
0
1) 2 (x0): Taking the limit yields:
lim inf
xn0!x0
V (x0)  V (xn0 )
x0   xn0
 u0(f(x0)  s01   x01)f 0(x0):
Note that, since s1 + x1 = (x0); we have s01 + x
0
1  s1 + x1: Then the concavity
of u (u0 is decrasing) implies:
lim inf
xn0!x0
V (x0)  V (xn0 )
x0   xn0
 u0(f(x0) s1 x1)f 0(x0) = u0(f(x0) (x0))f 0(x0): (15)
Conjoining (12) and (15), keeping in mind that lim sup  lim inf; we obtain:
lim sup
xn0!x0
V (x0)  V (xn0 )
x0   xn0
= lim inf
xn0!x0
V (x0)  V (xn0 )
x0   xn0
= u0(f(x0)  (x0))f 0(x0):
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Therefore V 0 (x0) exists and is equal to u
0(f(x0)  (x0))f 0(x0):
(ii) Now similarly, take a sequence of initial capitals xn0 converging to x0 from
above. Formally, xn0 ! x0; xn0 > x0: Let (c1; s1; x1) 2 (x0) be such that s1 + x1 =
 (x0): Take (cn1 ; s
n
1 ; x
n
1 ) 2 (xn0 ) for each n: Since x0 < xn0 ; increasingness of  implies
that x1 < xn1 and x1 + s1 < x
n
1 + s
n
1 : By (4), x1 + s1 < f(x0):
We claim that, for all n large enough, xn1 + s
n
1 < f(x0): Suppose otherwise:
xn1 + s
n
1  f(x0) for innitely many n. Then by upper semi-continuity of ; there
exists a subsequence n with x
n
1 + s
n
1  f(x0) and a triplet (
_
c1;
_
s1;
_
x1) 2 (x0);
such that (cn1 ; s
n
1 ; x
n
1 ) converges to (
_
c1;
_
s1;
_
x1): Clearly, x
n
1 + s
n
1  f(x0) and
(cn1 ; s
n
1 ; x
n
1 ) ! (
_
c1;
_
s1;
_
x1) implies that 
_
s1 +
_
x1  f(x0): But since (
_
c1;
_
s1;
_
x1) 2
(x0)  (x0); we obtain
_
c1 = 0; which is a contradiction with (4).
Therefore, for all n large enough, we have x1 + s1 < xn1 + s
n
1 < f(x0) < f(x
0
0):
Particularly, x1+s1 < f(xn0 ) and x
n
1+s
n
1 < f(x0): Then same method in (i) applies
and we obtain V 0+(x0) exists and is equal to u
0(f(x0)   (x0))f 0(x0):
Now we will establish the relation between the di¤erentiability of V and the
uniqueness of the optimal path. In order to do so, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 2.1 (i) If (c0; s0; x0) 2 (k); (c; s; x) 2 (k); s0 + x0 = s+ x; then x0 = x:
(ii) (k) =  (k) if and only if (k) has a single element.
(iii) Given k > 0; V is di¤erentiable at k if and only if (k) has a single element.
Proof. (i) By (3), c0 = f(k)  s0   x0 and c = f(k)  s  x: By (5) we have:
u0(f(k)  s0   x0) = 0(s0)V (x0);
u0(f(k)  s  x) = 0(s)V (x):
20
Since s0 + x0 = s + x; we have u0(f(k)   s0   x0) = u0(f(k)   s   x); i.e.
0(s0)V (x0) = 0(s)V (x):W.L.O.G. assume that x0 > x: Then s0 < s: Strictly increas-
ingness of V and decreasingness of 0 imply that V (x0) > V (x) and 0(s0)  0(s):
Then 0(s0)V (x0) > 0(s)V (x): Contradiction. Hence x0 = x:
(ii) If (k) is a singleton, it is clear that (k) =  (k): If (k) =  (k); we will prove
that (k) is a singleton. Suppose that there exists at least two di¤erent elements in
(x); say (c; s; x) and (c& ; s& ; x&): By denitions of (x) and  (x); the equality
(x) =  (x) implies s + x = s& + x& : Thus, (i) implies x = x& : Then s = s&
and c = f(k)   s   x = f(k)   s&   x& = c& . Hence, (c; s; x) = (c& ; s& ; x&):
Contradiction.
(iii) V is di¤erentiable at k > 0 i¤ V 0 (k) = V
0
+(k) i¤ u
0(f(k)   (k))f 0(k) =
u0(f(k)    (k))f 0(k) i¤ (k) =  (k): Then by (ii), V is di¤erentiable at k > 0 i¤
(k) has a single element.
Bringing together all of the above, we prove the following proposition concern-
ing the almost everywhere di¤erentiability of V and almost every uniqueness of the
optimal path.
Proposition 2.3 (i) Given x0; let (c; s; x) be an optimal path from x0. Then for any
t  1; (xt) has a single element.
(ii) Given x0; V 0(x0) exists if and only if there exists a unique optimal path from
x0.
(iii) V is di¤erentiable almost everywhere, or equivalently the optimal path is
unique for almost every initial capital x0 > 0:
Proof. (i) Assume the contrary. There exists t  1 such that (xt) has at least two
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di¤erent elements, say (ct+1; s

t+1; x

t+1) and (c
&
t+1; s
&
t+1; x
&
t+1): Then by (6):
u0(ct) = (st)f 0(xt)u0(ct+1);
u0(ct) = (st)f 0(xt)u0(c&t+1):
Thus, ct+1 = c
&
t+1: Along with (3), we obtain s

t+1 + x

t+1 = f(xt)   ct+1 = f(xt)  
c&t+1 = s
&
t+1 + x
&
t+1: By Lemma 2.1, we have x

t+1 = x
&
t+1: Then (c

t+1; s

t+1; x

t+1) =
(c&t+1; s
&
t+1; x
&
t+1); contradiction.
(ii) From (i), we know that given any (c1; s1; x1) 2 (x0); (x1) is a singleton,
say (c2; s2; x2): Again from (i), we have (x2) is a singleton say (c3; s3; x3): Then
inductively, we know that given any (c1; s1; x1) 2 (x0); the rest of the optimal path
is uniquely determined. This means that, the optimal path from x0 is unique if and
only if (c1; s1; x1) is unique, in other words (x0) is singleton valued. Then by the
previous lemma, the optimal path from x0 is unique if and only if V is di¤erentiable
at x0:
(iii) Since  is increasing,  and  are increasing functions. We know that a
bounded increasing function f : R! R is almost everywhere continuos. For the proof,
see the appendix of Le Van and Dana 2003. Then  and  are almost everywhere
continuous. Firstly, we will prove that the points of continuity of  and  are exactly
the same. Then we will prove that at these continuity points,  and  yield equal
values.
Now consider a xed number y; and two variables x; z with x < y < z: We have
x2=y < x < y < z < z2=y: Note that by denition, (k)   (k) for any k: Then the
increasingness of ;  and  imply:
 (x2=y)  (x)   (x)  (y)   (y)  (z)   (z)  (z2=y): (16)
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Let x and z converge to y. Then x2=y and z2=y also converge to y:
Now, if  is continuous at y; (z2=y) ! (y); (z) ! (y): Then (y) 
 (y)  (z)   (z)  (z2=y) implies that  (z) !  (y): Also, (x) ! (y);
(z) ! (y): Then (x)   (x)  (y)   (y)  (z) implies that  (x) !  (y):
Hence,  is continuous at y:
Conversely, if  is continuous at y;  (x2=y) !  (y);  (x) !  (y): Then we
get  (x2=y)  (x)   (x)  (y)   (y) which implies (x) ! (y): Also,
 (z) !  (y);  (x) !  (y): Then  (x)  (y)   (y)  (z)   (z) implies that
(z)! (y): Hence,  is continuous at y:
Therefore, the continuity points of  and  are coincident. Now let y be such
a point of continuity. Since (z) ! (y) as z ! y, (y)   (y)  (z) implies
that (y) =  (y): Now we have proved that  and  yield equal values at all of their
continuity points. But recall that they are almost everywhere continuous functions.
Then, (k) =  (k) for almost every k: By the lemma, (k) =  (k) implies that (k)
is a singleton, which implies that (k) is a singleton for almost every k; hence V is
di¤erentiable for almost every k: Then by (ii), V is di¤erentiable almost everywhere,
or equivalently the optimal path is unique for almost every initial capital x0 > 0:
2.4 Dynamic Properties of the Optimal Paths
We have proved the almost everywhere di¤erentiability of the value function, and the
almost everywhere uniqueness of the optimal path, for the so described model, which
were left as open questions in Stern (2006). Now as one can easily see, the increas-
ingness of  implies the monotonicity of the optimal path of capital stock. Formally,
for the optimal path (c; s; x) from x0 > 0; x is a monotonic sequence. Moreover,
as well known, the existence of the maximum sustainable capital stock along with
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the monotonicity of the optimal path of capital stock implies that the optimal path
of capital converges to a steady state. The monotonicity and convergence results of
any optimal path of capital are also available in Stern (2006). On the other hand,
the monotonicity or the convergence of c and s are not studied analytically in Stern
(2006). In this section, we will investigate the limiting behavior of the optimal path
without any specic functional forms. We will prove that c and s are convergent, and
provide conditions under which the system does not converge to zero.
Proposition 2.4 Let (c; s; x) be the optimal path from x0. Then, seperately c; s; x
are convergent sequences. Moreover, if
_
c;
_
s;
_
x are respectively the limits, then either
(
_
c;
_
s;
_
x) = (0; 0; 0) or
_
c;
_
s;
_
x > 0.
Proof. The fact that x must be convergent is already established, which also implies
that (f(xt)   xt+1)t converges. If (f(xt)   xt+1)t converges to zero, clearly the con-
straint of the problem imply that c and s also converge to zero. Now assume that x
converges to
_
x and (f(xt) xt+1)t coverges to some positive number, i.e. f(
_
x) _x > 0.
Notice that this also implies
_
x > 0:Dene (x; x0; s) := u0(f(x) x0 s) 0(s)V (x0):
Clearly  is continuous in all arguments and also strictly increasing in s, which
follows from the strict concavity of u and concavity of . Now there exists
_
s
such that (
_
x;
_
x;
_
s) = 0: Because, (
_
x;
_
x; 0) = u0(f(
_
x)   _x)   0(0)V (_x) =  1,
(
_
x;
_
x; f(
_
x) _x

) = u0(0)  (f(
_
x) _x

)V (
_
x) = +1, and  is strictly increasing in s. Note
that since  is strictly increasing in s,
_
s is uniquely determined. Now assume that
s is not convergent, in particular s does not converge to
_
s. Then 9" > 0 there exist
innitely many t for which we have
st+1   _s > ": W.L.O.G., for innitely many t;
we have st+1  
_
s > ": Then specically for these t, we have
(xt; xt+1; st+1) > (xt; xt+1;
_
s + "): (17)
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Note that by (5),
u0(f(xt)  xt+1   st+1) = 0(st+1)V (xt+1); 8t;
thus we have
(xt; xt+1; st+1) = 0;8t: (18)
Therefore, as t goes to innity, the continuity of  along with (17) and (18) yields
0  (_x; _x; _s + "). Recall that (_x; _x; _s), thus (_x; _x; _s)  (_x; _x; _s + ") which is a
contradiction with the strictly increasingness of . Hence, s converges to
_
s: Then (3)
implies c converges to
_
c := f(
_
x)  _x  _s:
Now let the optimal path (c; s; x) from x0 converge to (
_
c;
_
s;
_
x). If x0 = 0; it is
clear that (
_
c;
_
s;
_
x) = (0; 0; 0). Consider x0 > 0: Firstly, it is clear that
_
x  xm.
If
_
x = xm; the constraint implies that
_
c;
_
s = 0: Note that such a sequence (c; s; x)
cannot be optimal because after some period, zero utility will be gained with positive
capital accumulation around xm. If
_
x = 0, again the constraints imply that (
_
c;
_
s;
_
x) =
(0; 0; 0):
Now consider
_
x > 0. (5) i.e. u0(ct+1) = 
0(st+1)V (xt+1) and the Inada conditions
on u and  imply that
_
c = 0 if and only if
_
s = 0: However, if
_
c =
_
s = 0 and
_
x > 0;
we obtain a contradiction with (4). Then for the case where
_
x > 0; we have
_
c > 0;
_
s > 0:
Formally, dene a steady state as any triplet (
_
c;
_
s;
_
x) such that (
_
x) = (
_
c;
_
s;
_
x);
i.e. the stationary sequence (
_
c;
_
s;
_
x) starting from
_
x is optimal. We say (
_
c;
_
s;
_
x) is a
positive steady state if it is a steady state and
_
c;
_
s;
_
x > 0: Clearly from (4), a steady
state can either be (0; 0; 0) or a positive steady state.
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Now that we have proved the convergence of the optimal path rather than just
the optimal path of capital, we will also prove that the optimal path converges to a
steady state. In the preceeding part, we will present the condition under which the
optimal path converges to a positive steady state.
Theorem 2.2 The optimal path from any x0 converges to a steady state.
Proof. Let the optimal path from x0 be (c; s; x). It is clear that if x0 = 0; (c; s; x)
converges to (0; 0; 0) which is a steady state. Now if x0 > 0; let (c; s; x) converge
to (
_
c;
_
s;
_
x) > 0; in particular x converges to
_
x: Recall that  is upper-semi contin-
uous and singleton valued at each xt; t  1. Then (xt) = (ct+1; st+1; xt+1) has a
convergent subsequence which converges to a point in (
_
x): We already know that
(c; s; x) converges to (
_
c;
_
s;
_
x); hence (
_
c;
_
s;
_
x) 2 (_x): What is left to prove is that
(
_
c;
_
s;
_
x) = (
_
x) if (
_
c;
_
s;
_
x) 2 (_x): However, this is also clear since (_c; _s; _x) 2 (_x)
implies that the statinoary sequence (c0; s0; x0) = (
_
c;
_
s;
_
x) is feasible, and  is singleton
valued at each x0t; t  1; i.e. (
_
c;
_
s;
_
x) = (c02; s
0
2; x
0
2) = (x
0
1) = (
_
x):
Proposition 2.5 If (0)f 0(0) > 1; the optimal path from x0 > 0 converges to a
positive steady state.
Proof. Assume that (0)f 0(0) > 1 and x0 > 0: Let the optimal path (c; s; x) from
x0 converge to (
_
c;
_
s;
_
x). Suppose that (
_
c;
_
s;
_
x) = (0; 0; 0): As  and f 0 are continuous
functions, there exists N so that for all n > N , we have (sn)f 0(xn) > 1: Then
consider (6) for t > N :
u0(ct+1) = (st+1)f 0(xt+1)u0(ct+2) > u0(ct+2)
which implies ct+1 < ct+2: Inductively, we obtain 0 < cN+1 < cN+2 < :::However, ct
also converges to zero, which yields a contradiction. Hence the optimal path converges
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to a positive steady state.
Now if (
_
c;
_
s;
_
x) is a positive steady state of the system, then by (3), (5), (6), and
(27) we have respectively:
_
c + 
_
s +
_
x = f(
_
x);
u0(
_
c) = 0(
_
s)V (
_
x);
u0(
_
c) = (
_
s)f 0(
_
x)u0(
_
c);
V (
_
x) = u(
_
c) + (
_
s)V (
_
x):
2Note that these are necessary conditions for a positive steady state. Thus, if
(0)f 0(0) > 1; and also if the solution (
_
c;
_
s;
_
x) to the above system of equations
is unique, then clearly the system will posses global convergence to the prescribed
positive steady state. The above equations can be recast as:
_
c + 
_
s +
_
x  f(_x) = 0; (19)
u0(
_
c)
u(
_
c)
=
0(
_
s)
1  (_s) ; (20)
(
_
s)f 0(
_
x) = 1: (21)
2.5 The Relative Cost of Future Oriented Capital and the
Long Run Equilibrium
We show in a numerical example how a small perturbation to the price of future
oriented capital qualitatively changes the dynamical properties of the optimal policy.
In particular, we demonstrate the occurrence of a saddle-node bifurcation with respect
to the price of future oriented capital stock. We use the same functional forms
and the parameter set as Stern (2006) did while giving an example for the multiple
27
steady states and divergence and show that, with the same functional forms, only
by changing the value of relative cost of future oriented capital, one can also obtain
global convergence.
Assumption 2.5 u(c) = c; (s) = 1   e s ; f(k) = Ak; A > 0, and 0 <
f; ; ; g < 1:
Under this functional forms we dene the stationary Euler equation as:
E =
8>><>>:k > 0 :  =


ln 
1  1
Ak 1
  1

(Ak   k)
 +  ln 
1  1
Ak 1
9>>=>>; :
Consider the following set of parameters:
A = 3;  = 3=4;  = 0:85;  = 2=3;  = 4=5
In Figure 1, the bifurcation diagram is presented. It turns out that the critical
values for  are 1 = 0:806637 and 2 = 1:64558. As long as  < 0:806637, i.e. before
bifurcation occurs, there is only one steady state, xh, which is globally stable. As 
slowly increases, the steady state capital stock decreases.
For  = 0:806637 , an additional steady state appears in addition to xh and the
dynamics are now characterized by two steady states, xm < xh such that xh is locally
stable and xm is unstable in the sense that it is stable from the left but unstable from
the right.
When  slightly increases from its critical value 0:806637, the unstable steady state
splits into one locally stable and one unstable steady state through the saddle-node
28
bifurcation resulting in three steady states, xl(stable)< xm(unstable)< xh(stable), in
total. The coexistence of these three steady states is preserved until  = 1:64558.
As the value of  gets closer to the critical value 1:64558, the highest stable steady
state and the unstable steady state approach one another and at the critical value,
they merge into a non-hyperbolic steady state. Slightly above the critical value, the
non-hyperbolic steady state ceases to exist leaving only the stable steady state, xl
which is now globally stable. Further increases in  only a¤ects the value of the
stable steady state.
In sum, two types of the saddle-node bifurcation emerge. The di¤erence lies in
the following: In the rst one, the saddle-node bifurcation is realized for the pair
of steady states xm and xh and in the second, it is for the pair of steady states xl
and xm. Moreover, in the rst one, as  increases, a pair of stable and unstable
steady states emerges simultaneously from a non-hyperbolic steady state and in the
second, the qualitative change is in the form of coalescence of the steady states into
a non-hyperbolic steady state.
This result signies the importance of the price of future oriented capital stock on
the dynamic behavior of the system. The possibility of multiple steady states were
established numerically for specic functional forms in Stern (2006). However, with
the same functional forms, only by changing the value of , one can also obtain global
convergence.
In this chapter, we consider the e¤ects of the relative cost of the future oriented
capital on economic variables in the long term. In particular, we demonstrate the
occurrence of a saddle-node bifurcation with respect to the price of future oriented
capital stock. This is worth to examine optimal growth model with endogenous
time preference while relaxing the assumption that the cost of the future-oriented
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Figure 1: Bifurcation analysis for variations in 
capital is constant. Assuming that it changes with wealth would lets us consider the
factors inuencing the opportunity cost of time and e¤orts being assigned for the
accumulation of future oriented capital stock. This is in our future agenda.
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CHAPTER 3
STRATEGIC INTERACTION AND DYNAMICS UNDER
ENDOGENOUS TIME PREFERENCE1
To account for development patterns that di¤er considerably among economies
in the long run (Quah, 1996; Barro, 1997; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991), a va-
riety of one-sector optimal growth models that incorporate some degree of market
imperfections have been presented. These are based on technological external ef-
fects and increasing returns (Dechert and Nishimura, 1983; Mitra and Ray, 1984) or
the endogeneity of time preference (Becker and Mulligan, 1997; Stern, 2006; Erol et
al., 2011). They have characterized the optimal paths and proven the emergence of
threshold dynamics according to which the economies with low initial capital stocks
or incomes converge to a steady state with low per capita income, while economies
with high initial capital stocks converge to a steady state with high per capita income
(see Azariadis and Stachurski, 2005, for a survey). However, to what extent these
analyses are robust to the considerations of strategic interactions among agents in
the economy, still remains as a concern.
1This essay is our joint work with Carmen Camacho and Ça¼gr¬Sa¼glam and published in Journal
of Mathematical Economics, Volume 49, Issue 4 (August 2013).
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This paper presents a strategic growth model with endogenous time preference.
Each agent, receiving a share of income which is increasing in her own capital stock
and decreasing in her rivals, invests over an innite horizon to build her stocks. The
heterogeneity among agents arises from di¤erences in their initial endowment, their
share of aggregate income, and therefore in their subjective discount rates. We adopt
the noncooperative open loop Nash equilibrium concept, in which players choose
their strategies as simple time functions and they are able to commit themselves to
time paths as equilibrium strategies. In this setup, agents choose their strategies
simultaneously and each agent is faced with a single criterion optimization problem
constrained by the strategies of the rival taken as given. We focus on the qualita-
tive properties of the open-loop Nash equilibria and the dynamic implications of the
strategic interaction.
In line with the empirical studies concluding that the rich are more patient than
the poor (see Lawrence, 1991, and Samwick, 1998) and in parallel to the idea that the
stock of wealth is a key to reach better health services and better insurance markets,
we consider that the discount factor is increasing in the stock of wealth. However,
this implies that the objective function of each agents single criterion optimization
problem includes a multiplication of the discount function. This generally destroys
the usual concavity argument which is used in the proof of the di¤erentiability of value
function and the uniqueness of the optimal paths (see Benveniste and Scheinkman,
1979; Araujo, 1991).
Due to this potential lack of concavity and the di¤erentiability of the value func-
tions associated with each agents problem, we employ the theory of monotone com-
parative statics and the supermodular games based on order and monotonicity prop-
erties on lattices (see Topkis, 1998). The analyses on the properties of supermodular
games have been extensively concentrated in static games and to some extent in dy-
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namic games with stationary Markov strategies (see Cooper, 1999; Amir, 2005; Vives,
2005, for a general review). This may stem from the fact that the use of open-loop
strategies has been noted for being static in nature, not allowing for genuine strategic
interaction between players during the play of the game. There are, however, many
situations in which players lack any other information than their own actions and
time so that the open-loop strategies can turn out to be unavoidable. The players
may be unable to observe the state vector, let alone the actions of their rivals. In this
respect, showing how the supermodular game structure can be utilized in the analysis
of the dynamic games under open loop strategies is inevitable.
In this paper, we rst provide the su¢ cient conditions of supermodularity for
dynamic games with open-loop strategies based on two fundamental elements: the
ability to order elements in the strategy space of the agents and the strategic com-
plementarity which implies upward sloping best responses. In our dynamic game the
open-loop strategies are vectors instead of simple scalars. Hence, the game requires
an additional restriction to guarantee that all components of an agents best response
vector move together. This explains the role of the restriction that the payo¤ function
of each agent has to be supermodular in his own strategy given the strategy of his
rival. The supermodular game structure of our model let us provide the existence
and the monotonicity results on the greatest and the least equilibria. We sharpen
these results by showing the di¤erentiability of the value function and the uniqueness
of the best response correspondences almost everywhere. These allow us to derive
conclusions on the nature of best responses, the set of equilibria and the long-run
dynamics.
In particular, we analyze to what extent the strategic complementarity inherent
in agentsstrategies can alter the convergence results that could have emerged under
a single agent optimal growth model and try to answer the following questions: Can
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an agent with a larger initial stock credibly maintain this advantage to preempt
the rivals investment and reach a better long-run stock of capital? Put di¤erently,
is the initial dominance reinforced by the actions of the agents? Can small initial
di¤erences be magnied and then propagated through time? Can this kind of initial
advantages vanish in the non-cooperative equilibrium of this class of games with
strategic complementarity? Can the agent with a low initial capital stock pull the rich
to her lower steady state that she would never face while acting by herself? Under
what conditions do we have a unique equilibrium with strategic complementarity
under open-loop strategies?
The key feature of our analysis is that the stationary state Nash equilibria tend
to be symmetric under open-loop strategies. We show that the initially rich can
pull the poor out of poverty trap even when sustaining a higher level of steady state
capital stock for itself. A remarkable feature of our analysis is that it does not
rely on particular parameterization of the exogenous functions involved in the model.
Rather, it provides a more exible framework with regards to the discounting of time,
keeps the model analytically tractable and uses only general and plausible qualitative
properties.
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model. Tools
needed while utilizing the supermodularity of the game; equilibrium dynamics and
the steady state analysis have been discussed in Section 3.
3.1 The Model
We consider an intertemporal one sector model of a private ownership economy à la
Arrow-Debreu with a single good xt, and two innitely lived agents, i = 1; 2: The
single commodity is used as capital, along with labor, to produce output. Labor is
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presumed to be supplied in xed amounts, and the capital and consumption are in-
terpreted in per-capita terms. The production function is given by f (xt) :We assume
that each agent receives a share of income i(xit; x
j
t) =
xit
xit+x
j
t
; which is increasing in
her own capital stock xit; and decreasing in her rivals, x
j
t . The amount of current
resources not consumed is saved individually as capital until the next period. For a
given strategy of the rival, each agent chooses a path of consumption ci = fcitgt0 so as
to maximize the discounted sum of instantaneous utilities,
P1
t=0
 Qt
s=1 (x
i
s)

ui(cit)
where the functions u and  denote the instantaneous utility from consumption and
the level of discount on future utility, respectively.
In accordance with these, the problem of agent i can be formalized as follows:
max
fcit;xit+1g1t=0
1X
t=0
 
tY
s=1
(xis)
!
ui(cit); (P)
subject to
cit + x
i
t+1  i(xit; xjt)f(xit + xjt) + (1  )xit;8t;
cit  0; xit  0;8t;
(xi0; x
j
0)  0; xj = fxjtg1t=1  0; given,
where j 6= i 2 f1; 2g; and  2 (0; 1) is the depreciation rate of the capital stock.
Agents may only di¤er in their initial endowment, their share of output, and therefore
in their subjective discount rates.
Wemake the following assumptions regarding the properties of the discount, utility
and the production functions.
Assumption 3.1  : R+ ! R++ is continuous, di¤erentiable, strictly increasing
and satises supx>0  (x) = m < 1; supx>0 
0 (x) < +1:
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Assumption 3.2 u : R+ ! R+ is continuous, twice continuously di¤erentiable and
satises either u(0) = 0 or u(0) =  1: Moreover, u is strictly increasing, strictly
concave and u0(0) = +1 (Inada condition).
Assumption 3.3 f : R+ ! R+ is continuous, twice continuously di¤erentiable and
satises f(0) = 0. Moreover, f it is strictly increasing and limx!+1 f 0 (x) < .
We say that a path for capital xi = (xi1; x
i
2; :::) is feasible from (x
i
0; x
j
0)  0; if for
all t and given xj  0; if for any t  0; xi satises that 0  xit+1  g(xit; xjt) where
gi(xit; x
j
t) = 
i(xit; x
j
t)f(x
i
t + x
j
t) + (1  )xit:
Si (xj) denotes the set of feasible accumulation paths from (xi0; x
j
0): A consumption
sequence ci = (ci0; c
i
1; :::) is feasible from (x
i
0; x
j
0)  0; when there exists a path for
capital, xi 2 Si (xj) with 0  cit  gi(xit; xjt)   xit+1: As the utility and the discount
functions are strictly increasing, we introduce function U dened on the set of feasible
sequences as
U (xi j xj) =
1X
t=0
 
tY
s=1
(xis)
!
u
 
gi(xit; x
j
t)  xit+1

:
The preliminary results are summarized in the following lemma which has a standard
proof using the Tychonov theorem (see Le Van and Dana, 2003; Stokey and Lucas,
1989).
Lemma 3.1 Let x be the largest point x  0 such that f (x) + (1  )x = x. Then,
for any xi in the set of feasible accumulation paths we have xit  A(xi0+ xj0) for all t;
where A
 
xi0 + x
j
0

= max
 
xi0 + x
j
0

; x
	
: Moreover, the set of feasible accumulation
paths is compact in the product topology dened on the space of sequences xi and U
is well dened and upper semicontinuous over this set.
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In a recent paper, Erol et al. (2011) study the dynamic implications of the endoge-
nous rate of time preference depending on the stock of capital in a single consumer
one-sector optimal growth model. They prove that even under a convex technology
there exists a critical value of initial stock, in the vicinity of which, small di¤erences
lead to permanent di¤erences in the optimal path: economies with low initial capital
stocks converge to a steady state with low per capita income. On the other hand,
economies with high initial capital stocks converge to a steady state with high per
capita income. Indeed, it is shown that the critical stock is not an unstable steady
state so that if an economy starts at this stock, an indeterminacy will emerge.
In this paper, we propose a capital accumulation game where heterogeneous agents
consume strategically. Heterogeneity arises from di¤erences in their initial endow-
ment, their share of aggregate income, and therefore in their subjective discount rates.
Our interest focuses on the qualitative properties of the open-loop Nash equilibria and
the dynamic implications of the strategic interaction.
3.2 Non-Cooperative Di¤erence Game and Open-Loop
Nash Equilibrium
The noncooperative game in consideration is a triplet (N;S; fU i : i 2 Ng) where N =
f1; 2g is the set of players, S = i2NSi is the set of joint admissible strategies under
open-loop information structure and U i is the payo¤ function dened on S for each
player i 2 N; i.e., U i = U (xi j xj) :
Any admissible strategy for agent i is an innite sequence compatible with the
information structure of the game which is constant through time and restricted with
the initial pair of capital stock in the economy. Accordingly, the set of admissible
strategies for agent i; can be written as Si = 1t=1S
i
t ; where S
i
t =

0; gi(exit 1; exjt 1) ;
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with exit 1 = supSit 1; and exjt 1 = supSjt 1: Indeed, any strategy xi 2 Si is such that
xit 2 Sit ;8t where Si1 =

0; gi(xi0; x
j
0)

; Si2 =

0; gi
 
gi(xi0; x
j
0); g
j(xi0; x
j
0)

; :::; etc.
A few important remarks on the way the set of joint admissible strategies is
constructed are in order. Denoting the set of joint feasible strategies by ; for any
(xi;xj) 2 ; we have
(xi;xj) =
 [xj2XjSi (xj)  [xi2XiSj (xi) \;
where Xj = fxj : Si (xj) 6= ?g. It is important to recall from Topkis (1998) that
 =
 [xj2XjSi (xj) ([xi2XiSj (xi)) if and only if (xi;xj) =  for each (xi;xj)
in : However, note that under the open-loop information structure of our game,
the action spaces of the agents turn out to be dependent on each other converting
the game into a generalized game in the sense of Debreu (1952). More precisely,
 6=  [xj2XjSi (xj) ([xi2XiSj (xi)) as the set of feasible accumulation paths from
(xi0; x
j
0) of agent i is constrained by the choices of agent j. This simply prohibits to
order elements in the joint feasible strategy space and calls for additional restrictions
on the plan of the game in proving the existence of an equilibrium and analyzing
the long-run dynamics via order theoretical reasoning. The admissibility condition2
imposed on the set of feasible strategies of the agents allows to write the set of joint
admissible strategies as a simple cross product of the each agents set of admissible
strategies that constitute a complete lattice.3
2Whenever there exists a positive externality, i.e., @g
i(xit;x
j
t)
@xjt
 0;8t; the admissibility imposed
on the set of joint feasible strategies is far from a restriction. Even in case of negative externality,
i.e., @g
i(xit;x
j
t)
@xjt
< 0;8t; the long-run implications of our analysis will not rely on such a restriction.
Indeed, an admissible strategy of agent i is an innite sequence of capital stock feasible from (xi0; x
j
0)
constituted under the consideration of the highest feasible strategy of the rival.
3In order to be able to work on a joint strategy space which constitutes a complete lattice, one
may also introduce an ad-hoc rule that exhausts the available stock of capital at the period where
the joint strategies of the agents turn out to be infeasible (see Sundaram, 1989). However, in such
a case, showing that the payo¤ function of each agent exhibits "increasing rst di¤erences" on the
joint strategies turns out to be unnecessarily complicated.
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We adopt the noncooperative open loop Nash equilibrium concept, in which play-
ers choose their strategies as simple time functions and they are able to commit
themselves to time paths as equilibrium strategies. In this setup, agents choose their
strategies simultaneously and each agent is faced with a single criterion optimization
problem constrained by the strategies of the rival taken as given.
For each vector xj 2 Sj; the best response correspondence for agent i is the set of
all strategies that are optimal for agent i given xj :
Bri (xj) = arg max
xi2Si
U (xi j xj) :
A feasible joint strategy (xi ; x

j) is an open loop Nash equilibrium if
U
 
xi j xj
  U  xi j xj for each xi 2 Si and each i 2 N: (22)
Given an equilibrium path, there is no feasible way for any agent to strictly improve
his life-time discounted utility as the strategies of the other agent remains unchanged.
The set of all equilibrium paths for this noncooperative game (N;S; fU i : i 2 Ng) is
then identical to the set of pairs of sequences, (xi ; x

j) such that
xi 2 Bri
 
xj

and xj 2 Brj (xi ) : (23)
We will rst prove that the best response correspondence of each agent is non-empty
so that there exists an optimal solution to problem P. The dynamic properties of
the best response correspondence then follows from the standard analysis in optimal
growth models (see Stokey and Lucas, 1989; Le Van and Dana, 2003 and Erol et al.,
2011) .
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3.3 Dynamic Properties of the Best Responce
Correspondances
The existence of an optimal path associated with P follows from the set of feasible
accumulation paths being compact in the product topology dened on the space
of sequences xi and U i being upper semicontinuous for this product topology. Let
xi 2 Bri (xj) so that xi solves P given xj. We can prove that the associated optimal
consumption and capital paths are positive at equilibrium.
Proposition 3.1 Let xi 2 Bri
 
xj

.
i ) The associated optimal consumption path, ci (i; j 2 N; i 6= j) is given by
cit = g
i(xit; x
j
t )  xit+1;8t:
ii) Given fxj0; xjg; if xi0 > 0, every solution (xi; ci) to P satises
cit > 0; x
i
t > 0; 8t: (24)
Proof. It can be easily checked from the rst order conditions and the Inada condi-
tion.
In accordance with these, let the value function V associated with P be dened
by
8xi0  0; V
 
xi0 j fxj0;xjg

= max
xi2Si
U
 
xi j xj

: (25)
The bounds on discounting together with the existence of a maximum sustainable
capital stock guarantee a nite value function. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, one can
immediately show that the value function is non-negative and strictly increasing. If
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u (0) = 0 then the continuity of the value function immediately follows as well. If
u (0) =  1 then the value function turns out to be continuous in the generalized
sense so that it is continuous at any strictly positive point and it converges to  1
when the stock of capital converges to zero (see Le Van and Dana, 2003). Given
these, the Bellman equation associated with P follows.
Proposition 3.2 i) V satises the following Bellman equation:
8xi0  0; V
 
xi0 j fxj0;xjg

= maxfu  gi(xi0; xj0)  xi+
(xi)V
 
xi j fxj0;xjg
 j 0  xi  gi(xi0; xj0)g: (26)
ii) A sequence xi 2 Si(xj) is an optimal solution so that xi 2 Bri
 
xj

if and only
if it satises:
8t; V  xit j fxj0;xjg = ugi(xit; xjt )  xit+1+
(xit+1)V
 
xit+1 j fxj0;xjg

: (27)
Proof. See Le Van and Dana (2003) or Erol et al. (2011).
The optimal policy correspondence associated with P, i : R+ ! R+ is dened
as follows:
i
 
xi0 j fxj0;xjg

= argmaxfu  gi(xi0; xj0)  xi
+ (xi)V
 
xi j fxj0;xjg
 j xi 2 0; gi(xi0; xj0)g:
It is important to note that although the utility function is strictly concave, the
solution to P may not be unique as the multiplication of a discount function destroys
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the concave structure needed for uniqueness. We can prove the following properties
for the optimal policy correspondence associated with P.
Proposition 3.3 i) i
 
0 j fxj0;xjg

= f0g:
ii) If xi0 > 0 and x
i
1 2 i
 
xi0 j fxj0;xjg

; then 0 < xi1 < g
i(xi0; x
j
0):
iii) i is upper semicontinuous.
iv) xi 2 Bri(xj) if and only if xit+1 2 i
 
xit j fxj0;xjg

;8t:
v) The optimal correspondence i is increasing: if xi0 <

x
i
0; x
i
1 2 i
 
xi0 j fxj0;xjg

and

x
i
1 2 i

x
i
0 j fxj0;xjg

then xi1 <

x
i
1:
Proof. ii) Follows easily from (24). iii) See Le Van and Dana (2003). iv) Follows
from (27). v) See Dechert and Nishimura (1983) or Amir et al. (1991).
The increasingness of i is crucial for the convergence of optimal paths associated
with P and hence for the analysis of the long-run dynamics. Moreover, we have
also proven that the optimal correspondence,  is not only closed but also upper
semi-continuous.
With the positivity of the optimal consumption and the stock of capital, the Euler
equation associated with P easily follows.
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Proposition 3.4 When xi0 > 0; any solution xi 2 Bri(xj) satises the Euler equa-
tion associated with P for all t:
u0

gi(xit; x
j
t )  xit+1

= 
 
xit+1

u0

gi(xit+1; x
j
t+1)  xit+2
 @gi(xit+1; xjt+1)
@xit+1
+ 0
 
xit+1

V
 
xit+1 j fxj0;xjg

: (28)
Recall that in a standard optimal growth model with geometric discounting and
the usual concavity assumptions on preferences and technology, the optimal policy
correspondence is single valued. Furthermore, the properties of the optimal path are
easily found using the rst order conditions together with the envelope theorem, dif-
ferentiating the value function. However, in the ith agents problem P, although the
utility function is strictly concave, the solution, namely Bri(xj) may not be unique as
the objective function includes the multiplication of a discount function. This gener-
ally destroys the usual concavity argument in the proof of the di¤erentiability of value
function and the uniqueness of the optimal paths (see Benveniste and Scheinkman,
1979; Araujo, 1991). To this end, we show that the value function associated with
the ith agents problem P is di¤erentiable almost everywhere so that there exists a
unique path from almost everywhere.
Proposition 3.5 i) If xi 2 Bri(xj); then V is di¤erentiable at any xit; t  1: If
xi 2 Bri(xj); there exists a unique optimal path from xit for any t  1:
ii) V is di¤erentiable almost everywhere, i.e. the optimal path is unique for almost
every x0 > 0:
Proof. See Le Van and Dana (2003).
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We prove in the next proposition that the optimal paths associated with P are
monotonic. As a monotone real valued sequence will either diverge to innity or
converge to some real number, the monotonicity of the optimal capital sequences
xi 2 Bri(xj) will be crucial in the analysis of the dynamic properties and the long-
run behavior of the best response correspondences.
Proposition 3.6 For any initial condition (xi0; x
j
0); the optimal path xi 2 Bri(xj)
is monotonic.
Proof. Since i is increasing, if xi0 > x
i
1; we have x
i
1 > x
i
2: Then, by induction, it is
true that xit > x
i
t+1; 8t: If xi1 > xi0; using the same argument yields xit+1 > xit; 8t: Now
if xi1 = x
i
0; then x
i
0 2 i
 
xi0 j fxj0;xjg

: Recall that there exists a unique equilibrium
path from xit for any t  1: Since xi0 2 i
 
xi0 j fxj0;xjg

; xit = x
i
0; 8t:
We will now present the condition under which the convergence to a steady state
is guaranteed and concentrate on the behavior of the optimal paths xi 2 Bri(xj)
associated with P.
Proposition 3.7 i) There exists an  > 0 such that if supx>0 f 0(x) <
1 
m
; then any
optimal path xi 2 Bri(xj) converges to zero.
ii) Assume xi0 > 0: Let infx>0  (x) = : If
@gi(0;xj

0 )
@xi0
> 1

; then the optimal path
xi 2 Bri(xj) converges to a steady state xi > 0.
Proof. See Erol et al. (2011).
We will now concentrate on the existence of an open-loop Nash equilibrium to the
non-cooperative game (N;S; fU i : i 2 Ng). To achieve our goal, we will show that the
non-cooperative game (N;S; fU i : i 2 Ng) is a supermodular game under open-loop
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strategies. Besides, we will prove that under some regularity conditions, the set of
equilibria is a non-empty complete lattice.
3.4 Supermodular games and the existence of Nash
equilibrium
Let us rst outline the fundamental properties of the supermodular games:
Denition 3.1 (Topkis, 1998) A non-cooperative game (N; S; fU i : i 2 Ng) is a
supermodular game if the set S of admissible joint strategies is a sublattice of Rm (or
of
Q
i2N R
mi), and if for each i; j 2 N; i 6= j, the payo¤ function U i is supermodular
in xi on Si for each xj in Sj and U i has increasing di¤erences in (xi; xj) on SiSj.
These hypotheses on the payo¤ function for each agent i, imply that any two
components of agent is strategy are complements and each component of is strategy
is complementary with any component of j0s strategy. The following theorem provides
the existence of extremal equilibria in supermodular games with modest regularity
conditions.
Theorem 3.1 (Topkis, 1998) Consider a supermodular non-cooperative game de-
noted by (N;S; fU i : i 2 Ng) for which the set S of admissible joint strategies is
nonempty, compact and for each i; j 2 N; i 6= j; the payo¤ function U i is upper
semicontinuous in xi on Si (xj) for each xj in Sj, then the set of equilibria is a
nonempty complete lattice and a greatest and a least equilibrium exist.
There are two fundamental elements in supermodular games: the ability to order
elements in the strategy space of the agents and the strategic complementarity, which
45
implies upward sloping best responses. These properties of supermodular games have
been extensively used in static games and to some extent in dynamic games with
Markov perfect strategies (see Cooper, 1999; Amir, 2005; Vives, 2005, for a general
review). We already stated in the introduction that open-loop strategies do not allow
for genuine interaction between the players during the game. However, they are most
appropriate in situations where the information about the other players is reduced
to their initial condition or games with a very large number of players. We can add
games in which agents decide whether to enter or not a coalition. Suppose a number
of players who evaluate the benets of entering a coalition for a given period of time.
They would set the rules of the coalition at the time the decision is taken. To evaluate
the coalition, players would play open-loop strategies. For all these reasons, we believe
it is important to show how the supermodular game structure can be utilized in the
analysis of dynamic games under open loop strategies.
Here we consider a dynamic game with open-loop strategies and place related
restrictions on strategy spaces and payo¤ functions which lead to ordered strategy
sets and monotone best responses: as the other player selects higher strategies, the
remaining player will as well. This will allow us to derive conclusions on the nature
of best responses and the set of equilibria. To this end, the next proposition is crucial
as it establishes the conditions under which our capital accumulation game turns out
to be supermodular.
Proposition 3.8 The non-cooperative game (N;S; fU i : i 2 Ng) is a supermodular
game if for each i; j 2 N; i 6= j, and for all t;
@2

(xit)u
 
gi(xit; x
j
t)  xit+1

@xit@x
i
t+1
 0; (29)
@2

(xit)u
 
gi(xit; x
j
t)  xit+1

@xit@x
j
t
 0: (30)
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The set of equilibria for this supermodular game is a nonempty complete lattice and
there exist a greatest and a least equilibrium.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In this dynamic game with open-loop information structure strategies are vectors
instead of simple scalars. Hence, the game requires an additional restriction to guar-
antee that all components of an agents best response vector move together. This
explains the role of the restriction (29) that the payo¤ function of each agent has to
be supermodular in his own strategy given the strategy of his rival. Put di¤erently,
given the choice of the rival, the agent is better o¤ combining high activity in one
component of choice with high activity in another (see Cooper, 1999). The restriction
(30) ensures that the gains to a higher strategy by one player increase with the strat-
egy taken by the other so that the best responses turn out to be monotone. The key
characteristic of a supermodular game, namely the presence of strategic complemen-
tarities is ensured by the restriction (30) which essentially implies the monotonicity
property of the best responses.
Though the conditions (29) and (30) can be interpreted along general lines re-
garding the supermodularity of the non-cooperative dynamic games under open loop
information structure, a further renement of the conditions will be useful in provid-
ing their limitations and economic interpretations to the full extent. Indeed, under
Assumptions (1)-(3), the conditions (29) and (30) can be recast for each i; j 2 N;
i 6= j, and for all t as
0(xit)
(xit)
+
u00 (cit)
u0 (cit)
@gi(xit; x
j
t)
@xit
 0; 
0(xit)
(xit)
+
u00 (cit)
u0 (cit)
@gi(xit; x
j
t)
@xit
!
@gi(xit; x
j
t)
@xjt
+
@2gi(xit; x
j
t)
@xit@x
j
t
 0;
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respectively. Accordingly, the supermodularity of the non-cooperative game given by
(N;S; fU i : i 2 Ng) crucially depends on the sensitivity of the agentstime preferences
with respect to their stock of wealth and the sensitivity of the gains to a higher
strategy by one player with respect to the rivals stock of capital. Note that for
su¢ ciently low values of the marginal rate of patience, if the aggregate income of
each player decreases with the rivals stock of capital, a su¢ cient condition for the
supermodularity of the noncooperative game turns out to be the supermodularity
of the aggregate income of each agent, i.e. @
2gi(xti;xtj)
@xit@x
j
t
 0; 8i; j 2 N; i 6= j, and
8t. However, if the aggregate income of each player increases with the rivals stock of
capital then the supermodularity of each agents aggregate income becomes necessary
for the game to be supermodular.
Proposition 3.8 ensures the existence of an open loop Nash equilibrium path in
a supermodular game. The following proposition provides monotone comparative
statics results.
Proposition 3.9 Let T be a partially ordered set of parameters and (  () ;  2 T )
with   () = (N;S ; fU i : i 2 Ng) be a parameterized family of supermodular games.
S and U i denote the dependence of S and U i on parameter  . The set S of
admissible joint strategies is nonempty and compact for each  in T and is increasing
in  on T . If for each i; j 2 N; i 6= j, and for all t;
@2

(xit; )u
 
gi(xit; x
j
t ; )  xit+1; 

@xit@
 0; (31)
then the greatest and the least equilibrium of game   () are increasing in  on T .
Proof. See the Appendix.
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On a parameterized collection of supermodular games, the condition (31) ensures
that the best response correspondence of the agents, hence the extremal equilibrium
will be increasing in a parameter that may be endogenous or exogenous due to the
strategic complementarity inherent in the agentsstrategies. As an example, consider
that (x) =    e (x+)"where 0 < e " <  < 1, 0 < " < 1; and  > 0 (see Stern,
2006): Proposition 3.9 asserts that an increase in ; a measure of patience, leads
to an increase in the extremal open loop Nash equilibria of the supermodular game
(N;S; fUi : i 2 Ng). That is, the more patient agents are, the larger the individuals
capital stock at every period in the greatest and the least equilibrium trajectories.
In what follows we will concentrate on the dynamic properties of the open-loop
Nash equilibria of the supermodular game (N;S; fU i : i 2 Ng) : Since the open loop
Nash equilibrium is weakly time consistent, instead of referring to the discrete time
Hamiltonian, we will focus on the closed loop representation of the equilibrium strate-
gies and utilize (26), (27), and Proposition 3.7 in determining the dynamic properties
of the equilibrium paths.
3.5 Dynamic Properties of the Open-Loop Nash
Equilibrium and the Steady State
Let (xi ; x

j) be an open loop Nash equilibrium from (x
i
0; x
j
0) of the noncoopera-
tive game (N;S; fU i : i 2 Ng) : We denote by fxi0;xi g the ith agents trajectory
of capital stock at such an equilibrium path, i.e., fxi0;xi g =
 
xi0; x
i
1 ; ::; x
i
t ; :::

:
It is then clear that (xi ; x

j) satises (23). Hence x

i solves P given xj so that
xit+1 2 i
 
xit j fxj0;xjg

;8t:
Let infx>0  (x) =  and
@gi(0;xj

0 )
@xi0
> 1

; for each i; j 2 N; i 6= j: The optimal
paths xi 2 Bri(xj) and xj 2 Brj (xi ) converge to the steady state values xi > 0 and
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xj > 0; respectively. These steady state values solve the following stationary state
Euler equations:
u0
 
gi(xi; xj)  xi = 0(xi)u (gi(xi; xj)  xi)
1  (xi) +
(xi)u0
 
gi(xi; xj)  xi @gi(xi; xj)
@xi
;8i; j 2 N; i 6= j: (32)
However, it is important to note that the stationary sequences associated with
each solution of (32) may not induce a steady state open loop Nash equilibrium (see
Dockner and Nishimura, 2001) unless they constitute a best reply to each other. A
steady state open loop Nash equilibrium (xi; xj) is dened as the stationary sequences
associated with a solution (xi; xj) to (32) such that fxi0;xig = (xi; xi; ::; xi; :::) 2
Bri(xj) and

xj0;xj
	
= (xj; xj; ::; xj; :::) 2 Brj(xi):
If the game was symmetric, we could have already concluded that the two agents
will end up with the same amount of physical capital in the long-run. Indeed, if a
supermodular game is symmetric, then a greatest and a least equilibria exist and they
are symmetric. Amir et al. (2008) show that monotonicity induces the greatest and
the least equilibrium converge to the highest and the lowest symmetric steady states,
respectively. A game is symmetric supermodular if on top of the usual conditions for
supermodularity, the agentsstrategy spaces are identical and
U (xi j xj) = U (xj j xi) ; 8(xi;xj) 2 S:
Neither of these latter conditions are met in our game. Strategy spaces coincide
only when the initial conditions are identical for both of the agents. Furthermore,
the second condition also fails at the rst period since we have u
 
gi(xi0; x
j
0)  xi1
 6=
u
 
gj(xj0; x
i
0)  xi1

for each i; j 2 N; i 6= j: Despite the lack of symmetry in the game,
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we prove that our game always leads to symmetric steady states so that the initial
wealth di¤erences vanish in the long run.
Proposition 3.10 All steady state open loop Nash equilibria of the supermodular
game (N;S; fU i : i 2 Ng) are symmetric.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In the following proposition, we show that the individual level of capital stock at
the lowest and the highest steady state open loop Nash equilibrium is greater than
the lowest and the highest steady states of the associated single agent optimal growth
problem, respectively.
Proposition 3.11 Let xL and xH denote the lowest and the highest steady states of
the optimal growth problem and xoL and x
o
H denote the lowest and the highest steady
state open loop Nash equilibrium of the noncooperative game (N;S; fU i : i 2 Ng). If
the game is supermodular then we have xL  xoL and xH  xoH :
Proof. See the Appendix.
Next, we identify the most preferred steady state depending on the game elements.
Corollary 3.1 Let (x^; x^) and (x; x) denote the highest and the lowest symmetric
stationary open loop Nash equilibria of the game (N;S; fU i : i 2 Ng). If
@
@x

u (g(x; x)  x)
1  (x)

> 0;
then (x^; x^) is the most preferred steady state open loop Nash equilibrium. Otherwise,
(x; x) will be the most preferred.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
Recall that the stationary sequences associated with each solution of (32) may not
constitute a steady state open loop Nash equilibrium. This moves the concern on the
number of solutions to the stationary Euler equations and among those that will be
induced by a steady state open loop Nash equilibrium. Since one cannot provide an
analytical answer to this question, we will move on to the numerical analysis of our
problem. Next section is devoted to this end. For given functional forms, we analyze
the solutions to (32). In order to determine which of these indeed constitute a steady
state open loop Nash equilibrium, we employ the iterations of the Bellman operator
(26) for the given stationary strategy of the rival. We compute the dynamics of the
equilibrium paths from an initial condition, using the supermodular structure of the
game on top of the iterations of the Bellman operator.
3.6 Characterization of the Long-Run Equilibria:
Numerical Analysis
The analysis of the solutions to the stationary Euler equations and the determination
of solutions induced by a stationary open loop Nash equilibrium can not be carried out
without specifying the forms of the utility, discount and the production functions. In
what follows, our analysis will be based on the functional forms specied in accordance
with Stern (2006). The utility, production and the discount functions are specied as
u(c) =
c1 
1   ;
f(x) = Ax + (1  )x;
(x) =    e (x+)" ;
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where 0 < fA; g; 0 < ; ; " < 1; and 0 < e " <  < 1: Under these functional
forms, in reference to Proposition 3.8, a su¢ cient condition for our strategic growth
model to become a supermodular game is:

0
(xit)
(xit)
 (   1)
 
xjt + x
i
t

+ xit
xit
 
xit + x
j
t
 ;8t  1: (33)
Condition (33) is trivially checked for   1 when  is su¢ ciently large, since 
0

is
a decreasing function and its supremum equals "
 1+"
 e " : In accordance with these, we
utilize the following set of fairly standard coe¢ cients as our benchmark parameteri-
zation:
A = 0:75;  = 0:4;  = 0:03;  = 1:5;  = 0:95;  = 2:5;  = 4:5; " = 0:99;
under which the maximum sustainable level of capital stock turns out to be:
A
 
xi0 + x
j
0

= max
 
xi0 + x
j
0

; x
	
; where
 
x is 213:747:4
We prove in the rst subsection of the sequel that strategic interaction removes
indeterminacy, in case indeterminacy existed in the single agent optimal growth prob-
lem. Then, we continue our numerical analysis with the case in which multiplicity of
equilibria persists in the long-run.
4Our analysis utilizes a felicity function constrained to a negative domain. Schumacher (2011)
shows that if the discount rate is endogeneized via a state variable, the domain of the felicity
function should be constrained to a positive domain. In a negative domain, a higher stock of capital
would have a negative impact on overall welfare. However, under our parameterization, even with
a negative felicity function constrained to a negative domain, a higher stock of capital will have a
positive impact on welfare. Indeed, our discount factor attributed to the utility of consumption at
period t increases with the level of capital stock, as in Becker and Mulligan (1997) and Stern (2006).
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3.6.1 Strategic Interaction Removes Indeterminacy
Under our benchmark parametrization, we prove numerically that strategic growth
removes indeterminacy and implies global convergence towards a unique symmetric
steady state. In order to provide a better exposition of this point, and to provide
a basis of comparison for our strategic growth model, we rst recall the analysis of
Erol et al. (2011) and we concentrate on the dynamic implications of endogenous
discounting in the single agent framework.
Case 3.1 Optimal growth framework.
Consider problem P in which only agent i starts with a positive stock, xj0 = 0 and
xi0 > 0, i.e. agent i acts alone. There exist three solutions to (32): xl = 0:5953,
xm = 2:9155; and xh = 8:4913. In order to determine which of these are actually
the optimal steady states, we analyze the optimal policy using the Bellman operator.
Figure 2 indicates that xl and xh are stable optimal steady states, but in contrast
with Stern (2006), Figure 2 strongly indicates that xm is not an optimal steady state.
Indeed, if it were, the optimal policy would have crossed the y = x line at xm: The
Bellman operator also reveals the existence of a genuine critical point at xc  5:5846:
for any initial capital stock level lower than xc, the economy will face a development
trap, enforcing convergence to a very low capital level xl. On the other hand, for any
initial capital level higher than xc, the optimal path will converge to xh. However, if
an economy starts at xc; an indeterminacy will emerge.
Case 3.2 Strategic growth
Consider now the case where (xi0; x
j
0) > 0: Let infx>0  (x) = : Note that
@gi(0;xj

0 )
@xi0
> 1

: Under the benchmark parameter values, there exists a unique symmet-
ric solution of the stationary state Euler equations (32): (xi ; x

j) = (10:8906; 10:8906).
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Figure 2: Optimal policy after 300 iterations on the zero function
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Indeed, consider a two region economy, one with a large initial stock of capital and
the other with almost none, take for example xi0 = 0:1 and x
j
0 = 10: Whenever they
act independently of each other, the poor region ends up in a development trap,
xl = 0:5953, whereas the rich region reaches a steady state level of capital stock
xh = 8:4913: However, if there exists a strategic interaction between the two regions,
they both reach an identical steady state level of capital (xi ; x

j) = (10:8906; 10:8906) :
Thanks to the strategic interaction between regions, the rich region pulls the poor
out of poverty trap while sustaining a higher level of steady state capital stock in the
rich region.
3.6.2 Multiplicity of Equilibria
As we have already underlined, in a single agent optimal growth framework, the
capital dependent time preference rate generates a critical point. In the vicinity
of this critical point, small di¤erences lead to permanent di¤erences in the optimal
path. Since this result heavily depends on the value of ; we would like to de-
viate from the benchmark to explore how strategic interaction modies the single
agent result. Hence, we assign a lower value to ,  = 4. The supermodular game
(N;S; fU i : i 2 Ng) studied in this section exhibits multiple long-run equilibria al-
though a single agent optimal growth model exhibits global convergence. Indeed,
there exist three solutions to the stationary Euler equation (32) of the single agent
optimal growth problem: xl = 0:3708, xm = 4:0061; and xh = 8:4315. Among
these three solutions, xl turns out to be the only optimal steady state (see Figure 3).
The natural question is then to what extent strategic growth dynamics are a¤ected
from such a change? When we consider the dynamic implications of strategic growth
we note that there are multiple solutions of the stationary state Euler equations as
listed below. The stationary sequences associated with only those in bold are indeed
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Figure 3: Low steady state (xl = 0:59) is optimal
constituting a steady state open loop Nash Equilibrium as we show later:
(xi; xj) = f(0:864;0:864) ; (2:2404; 2:2404) ; (10:8863;10:8863) ;
(2:7941; 1:1354) ; (2:3869; 10:4927) ; (1:1353; 2:7941) ; (10:4927; 2:3869)g:
The stationary sequences associated with the asymmetrical solutions above do not
constitute a steady state open loop equilibrium of our game as announced in Propo-
sition 3.10. Among the three symmetric solutions to the stationary Euler equations
(32), the stationary sequences associated with the lowest and the highest pairs con-
stitute a steady state open loop equilibrium is shown in Figures 4 and 5 respectively.
In other words, when the initial condition is (xi0; x
j
0) = (10:8863; 10:8863), then the
stationary strategies of the agents sticking to the initial condition constitute a best
reply to each other so that (10:8863; 10:8863) turns out to be a steady state open loop
equilibrium. The same is true for (0:864; 0:864). As we show in Proposition 3.11, both
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of them are higher than the unique steady state of the single agent optimal growth
problem.
We can easily show that threshold dynamics emerge. There exist critical values of
initial capital (xc; xc), below which an open loop Nash equilibrium of our supermodu-
lar game will converge to the lowest steady state (0:864; 0:864). There exists a second
critical point, (xc; xc) above which a sequence of an open loop Nash equilibrium will
converge to the highest steady state (10:8863; 10:8863). Noteworthy, these critical
values are not a solution of the stationary state Euler equations so that the station-
ary sequences associated with these can not constitute a stationary state open loop
equilibrium of the game. As the optimal policy of agent i is upper semi continuous,
given the strategy of the rival xj ! 10:8863; the graph of i(xi j fxj0; xjg) jumps over
45 line at xc so that xc =2 i(xc j fxj0; xjg): With an analogous reasoning, given the
strategy of the rival is xj ! 0:864; the graph of i(xi j fxj0; xjg) jumps over 45 line
at xc so that xc =2 i(xc j fxj0; xjg) This implies even further that as soon as xc = xc
an indeterminacy arises so that for a game emanating from such a critical stock of
capital, the best responses of the two agents that converge either to low or to the
high steady state may both constitute an open loop Nash equilibrium.
58
Figure 4: Stationary sequence associated with (xi = 0:863991) is an open
loop Nash equilibrium
Figure 5: Stationary sequence associated with (xi = 10:8863) is an open
loop Nash equilibrium
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CHAPTER 4
GAMES OF COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES UNDER
ENDOGENOUS DISCOUNTING
The exploitation of the natural resources over time is directly linked with the issue
of time preference. While the time preference is one of the major factor on allocation
of the resources, these resources can also a¤ect societys time preference. There is
a new but growing literature considering the dependence of time preference to the
aggregate variables while studying extinction and exploitation of renewable resources.
Meng (2006) extends the one sector optimal growth model by considering the e¤ects
of social factors on time preference, particularly economy wide avarage consumption
and production. Ayong Le Kama and Schubert (2007) study the consequences of
endogenous time preference depending on the environmental quality in an optimal
growth framework. Tsur and Zemel (2009) consider the social discount rate that
includes the occurance hazard under risk of abrupt climate change and study optimal
emission policy for a growing economy. However, none of these studies investigate
the implications of endogenous discounting under strategic interaction.
The shery model has been used as a metaphor for any kind of renewable resource
on which the property rights is not well dened.(see Long, 2010, for a comprehensive
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survey) In these models, the sets of feasible strategies available to the players are
interdependent and in addition, the agentschoices in the current period a¤ect the
payo¤s and their choice sets in the future.
In this chapter, we focus on the economy wide determinants of the individual rate
of time preference, particularly, we consider the socially determined time preference
which depends on the level of sh stock and completely characterize the basic shery
model under this setup. Our aim is to incorporate this insight into the theoretical
formulations in a way that will increase the accuracy of predictions while not losing
any other values like tractability and generality.
Our interest focuses on the qualitative properties of open-loop Nash equilibrium
(OLNE). By using a discrete time formulation, we study existence and e¢ ciency
of the equilibrium. Under constant discounting, there exists OLNE that is Pareto-
e¢ cient has been shown by Chierella et. al. (1984) and Dockner and Kaitala (1989)
in continuous time. In discrete time, Amir and Nannerup (2006) obtain this result
for a logarithmic utility and cobb douglas production function. We show that this
result can not be extended to the endogenous discounting case: We can not rely on
symmetric social planner problem while showing existence and qualitative properties
of Nash equilibrium. Instead, we use a topological xed point theorem to show
existence of OLNE.
Depending on the return is bounded or unbounded from below, OLNE may result
in overexploitation or underexploitation of the resources relative to e¢ cient solution.
The OLNE di¤ers from the collusive equilibria in terms of not only e¢ ciency but
also equilibrium dynamics. As it is shown by Erol et. al. (2011) under standard
preferences and technology, endogenous discounting creates threshold dynamics such
that every equilibrium that starts to the left of the threshold level converges to low
steady state and every equilibrium that starts to the right of the threshold level
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converges to the high steady state. We show that open loop information structure
can remove indeterminacy that we may face under collusive equilibrium and be a
source of multiplicity despite the uniqueness we may face under collusive equilibrium.
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model.
The existence and e¢ ciency of collusive, and open loop equilibrium are discussed
successively in section 3 and 4. Finally, section 5 concludes.
4.1 The Model
Consider a nite number, n; of agents having identical preferences. N = f1; 2; :::; ng
is the set of players. The real valued function u gives the instantaneous utility from
consumption where the ith player consumption at period t is denoted by cit. At each
period t; f(kt) units of the resource are available for consumption. Then, the leftover
resource stock, kt+1 = f(kt)  
NP
i=1
cit; generates the next period resource, f(kt+1). In
accordance with these, the problem of each agent i can be formalized as follows:
max
fcitg1t=0
1X
t=0
 
tY
s=1
(ks)
!
u(cit); (34)
subject to
8t;
NP
s=1
cst + kt+1  f(kt) (35)
8i; cit  0; kt+1  0; (36)
k0 > 0; given,
where the real valued function (ks) is the level of discount on future utility.
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We make the following assumptions regarding the properties of the utility, pro-
duction and discount functions.
Assumption 4.1 u : R+ ! R+ is continuous, twice continuously di¤erentiable and
satises u(0) = 0: Moreover, it is strictly increasing, strictly concave and u0(0) = +1
(Inada condition).
Assumption 4.2 u : R+ ! R+ is continuous, twice continuously di¤erentiable and
u(0) =  1: Moreover, it is strictly increasing and strictly concave.
Assumption 4.3 f : R+ ! R+ is continuous and strictly increasing. Moreover,
there exists an
 
k such f (k) < k whenever k >
 
k and f 0(0) = +1:
Assumption 4.4  : R+ ! R++ is continuous and di¤erentiable. Moreover, it
satises supk>0  (k) = m < 1; sup
k>0
0 (k) < +1:
Since the Samuelsons seminal work in 1937, discounted utility model in which an
instantenous utility is discounted with a constant rate has been used broadly in spite of
the reservations of the Samuelson by himself, on the normative and descriptive validity
of the model. We assume that the rate of time preference depends on the resource
stock. In particular, the discount factor attributed to the utility of consumption at
period t increases with the level of resource stock available at the same period.
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4.2 The Collusive Equilibrium
Social planner who is seeking the symmetric pareto optimal solution solves the fol-
lowing problem:
max
fkit;citg1t=0
1X
t=0
 
tY
s=1
(ks)
!
NP
s=1
u(cst)
subject to
8t;
NP
s=1
cst + kt+1  f(kt)
k0  0; given
For any initial condition k0  0, when k = (k0; k1; k2; :::) is such that 0  kt+1 
f(kt) for all t, we say it is feasible from k0 and the class of all feasible accumulation
paths is denoted by (k0).
As the period utility is strictly concave, we can impose symmetry of agents con-
sumption paths and the problem turns out to be:
V (k0) = maxfctg1t=0
1X
t=0
tY
s=1
(ks)u(ct)
subject to
8t; nct + kt+1  f(kt)
k0  0; given
The case with bounded from below returns is analyzed completely by Erol et
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al.(2011). By generalizing to the case with unbounded from below returns, we provide
the results needed:
Proposition 4.1 Under the assumptions of 4.1 or 4.2 and 4.3 and 4.4, for any
k0  0;
(i) There exists an optimal accumulation path k such that
8t; kt  A(k0) = maxfk0; kg:
The associated optimal consumption path c is given by:8t 2 1::1 and 8s 2 N , cst =
f(kt) kt+1
n
:
(ii) If k0 > 0; the optimal path (c;k) satises kt > 0; cst = c
l
t > 0 for all s; l 2 N:
(iii) V (k0) is strictly increasing and veries the Bellman equation:
V (k0) = max

u

f(k0)  k1
N

+  (k1)V (k1) : 0 < k1 < f(k0)

: (37)
(iv) Let g : R+ ! R+ be the argmax correspondence of 37. Then, g is non-empty,
upper semi-continuous and increasing in the sense that if k0  k00 then k1 2 g (k0) <
k01 2 g (k00) : Moreover, a sequence k feasible from k0  0 is optimal if and only if
kt+1 2 g (kt) for all t:
(v) When k0 > 0 any solution k 2 (k0) satises the Euler equation:
u0(ct) =  (kt+1)u0(ct+1)f 0(kt+1) +N
0 (kt+1)V (kt+1) (38)
(vi) An optimal path k from k0 is monotonic.
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Proof. Under the case with bounded from below returns, the results follows from
Erol et. al.(2011) Lemma 1 and Proposition 1,2,3,4,5 and 8.
When we have unbounded from below returns, we have to reconsider part (i) and
(iv). As the utility and the discount functions are strictly increasing, we introduce
function U dened on the set of feasible sequences as
U (k) =
1X
t=0
 
tY
s=1
(ks)
!
u(
f(kt)  kt+1
N
):
Since u () is concave, there exist A 0; B  0 such that u(c)  Bc + C; 8c  0:For
every k 2 (k0) ; we have f(kt)  A(k0): This implies that, for a given  > 0; there
exist T0 such that, for any T  T0; for any k 2 (k0) ; we have
1X
t=T
 
tY
s=T+1
(ks)
!
u+(
f(kt)  kt+1
n
)  Tm
BA(k0) + C
1  m
 :
where u+ denotes the positive value of u.
Let kn 2 (k0) converge to k 2 (k0) and  > 0 be given. Then there exists T0
such that, for any n, for any T  T0;
U (kn) 
TX
t=0
 
tY
s=1
(kns )
!
u(
f(knt )  knt+1
N
) + :
By letting T !1; we have
lim supU (kn)  U (k) + 
Since  is arbitrarily chosen, we have lim supU (kn)  U (k) i.e. U () is upper semi-
continuous. The existence of the optimal solution follows from the fact that U (k) is
upper semi continuous and (k0) is compact in the product topology (see Erol et.
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al.(2011), Lemma 1 a,b.)
(iv) Since V (0) =  1; we can not use the the theorem of the maximum while
proving the upper semi-continuity of g () : Let fkn0 g be a sequence that converges to
k0 and let yn 2 g (kn0 ) ; 8n:We have 0  yn  f(kn0 ); 8n: Since f () is continuous, the
sequence fyng will be uniformly bounded when n is large enough. We can assume
that it converges to some y 2 [0; f(k0)] : Take any z 2 [0; f(k0)] : One can nd a
sequence fzng included in [0; f(kn0 )] for every n large enough, which converges to z.
We have:
8n; V (kn0 ) = u (f(kn0 )  yn) +  (yn)V (yn)  u (f(kn0 )  zn) +  (zn)V (zn):
By letting n go to innity, we have
V (k0) = u (f(k0)  y) +  (y)V (y)  u (f(k0)  z) +  (z)V (z)
so that y 2 g (k0) :
Next proposition provides the condition under which the solution to the collusive
problem is independent of the number of players.
Proposition 4.2 If the period utility is homogenous in consumption, then the optimal
accumulation path for the collusive problem is independent of number of players.
Proof. Since u

f(kt) kt+1
N

= h (N)u (f(kt)  kt+1) ; collusive problem can be writ-
ten as,
V (k0) = h (N) maxfktg1t=0
1X
t=0
tY
s=1
(ks)u (f(kt)  kt+1)
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which assures that the solution does not depend on N.
Since the optimal path is monotonic and bounded with A(k0) = maxfk0; kg, there
exist a steady state satisfying the necessary condition below:
u0

f(k)  k
N

=  (k)u0

f(k)  k
N

f 0(k) +N
0 (k)u

f(k) k
N

1   (k) (39)
Next, we adopt the noncooperative open loop Nash equilibrium concept, in which
players choose their strategies as simple time functions and they are able to commit
themselves to the time paths as equilibrium strategies. Players choose their strategies
simultaneously and best response correspondance of each player is dened with a
single criterion optimization problem constrained by the strategies of the rival taken
as given.
4.3 The Open-Loop Equilibrium
First, we show that the OLNE is e¢ cient under constant discounting so that existence
of OLNE directly follows from the collusive problem. But, this result can not be
generalized to social time preference depending on the stock of wealth.
Given the optimal decisions of the rival, each agent chooses a path of consump-
tion ci = fcitgt0 so as to maximize a discounted sum of instantaneous utilities. In
accordance with these, the problem of each agent i can be formalized as follows:
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max
fcitg1t=0
1X
t=0
 
tY
s=1
(ks)
!
u(cit); subject to (40)
8t;
NP
s=1
cst + kt+1  f(kt)
k0  0; cj = fcjtg1t=1  0; given, where j 6= i 2 f1::Ng
Given the open loop strategies of the rivals, agent i faces a dynamic optimization
problem. For any initial condition k0  0; and for a given cj  0; when k = (k1; k2; :::)
is such that
P
s 6=i
cst  f(kt)   kt+1 for all t; we say it is feasible from k0 The class of
all such feasible accumulation paths from k0 is denoted by Si (c i) : A consumption
sequence ci = (ci0; c
i
1; :::) is feasible from k0  0; when there exists k 2 Si (c i) with
0  cit  f(kt) 
P
s 6=i
cst kt+1: As utility is strictly increasing, we introduce the function
U dened on the set of feasible sequences as
U(k j c i)=
1X
t=0
 
tY
s=1
(ks)
!
u
 
f(kt) 
P
s 6=i
cst   kt+1
!
:
We can solve the dynamic optimization problem via the discrete time Maximum
Principle (for the details, see Dechert 1997). By introducing the discount rate as
another constraint, the problem can be rewritten as:
max
fcitg1t=0
1X
t=0
tu(c
i
t); subject to
8t;
NP
s=1
cst + kt+1  f(kt) and t+1 = (kt+1)t
k0  0; 0 = 1; cj = fcjtg1t=1  0; given, where j 6= i 2 f1::Ng
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The state variables are ft; ktg ; costate variables are fpit; sitg and control variable is
fcitg. The discrete time Hamiltonian for the ith agents problem can be written as:
H i
 
t; kt; p
i
t+1; s
i
t+1; c
i
t

= tu(c
i
t) + p
i
t+1

f(kt) 
NP
s=1
cst

+ sit+1

(f(kt) 
NP
s=1
cst)t

The rst order condition for the optimization is:
tu
0(cit) = p
i
t+1 + s
i
t+1
0(f(kt) 
NP
s=1
cst)t (41)
and the canonical equations are:
pit =

pit+1 + s
i
t+1

0(f(kt) 
NP
s=1
cst)t

f 0(kt) (42)
sit= u(c
i
t) + s
i
t+1

(f(kt) 
NP
s=1
cst)

(43)
By iterating (43), we get
sit =
1
t
1P
r=t
u(cir)r
From (41) and (42), one can recast that
pit = tu
0(ct)f 0(kt):
Substituting
 
pit+1; s
i
t+1

and rewriting (41);
u0(cit) =  (kt+1)u
0(cit+1)f
0(kt+1) +
0 (kt+1)
t+1
1P
r=t+1
u(cir)r
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By dening V i(kt+1) = u(cit+1) +  (kt+2)V
i(kt+2); we obtain that
u0(cit) =  (kt+1)u
0(cit+1)f
0(kt+1) + 
0 (kt+1)V i(kt+1) (44)
Condition (44) is identical to (38) under constant discounting. This assures that there
exist an open loop Nash equilibrium which is e¢ cient. However, this is not valid under
endogenously determined time preference. We can not rely on collusive problem while
showing existence and qualitative properties of open loop Nash equilibrium.
4.4 Existence of OLNE
We rst dene the best response correspondance on the feasible accumulation paths.
Suppose that we are given a sequence of resource stock k = (k1; k2; :::) satisfying
kt+1  f(kt);8t:By the symmetry of the problem, we let all players but player i,
consume ct =
(f(kt) kt+1)
n
. Consider the following problem,
max
fxtg1t=0
1X
t=0
 
tY
s=1
(xs)
!
u

f(xt)  xt+1   (N   1) (f(kt)  kt+1)
N

(45)
subject to 8t; 0  xt+1  f(xt)  (N   1) (f(kt)  kt+1)
N
x0  0; k = fktg1t=1  0; given.
The value function associated with the problem (45) takes the following form:
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V (x0; k1; k2; k3::) = maxfxtg1t=0
1X
t=0
 
tY
s=1
(xs)
!
u

f(xt)  xt+1   (N   1) (f(kt)  kt+1)
N

;
subject to 8t; 0  xt+1  f(xt)  (N   1) (f(kt)  kt+1)
N
x0  0; k = fktg1t=1  0; given.
Let
U (x0;k;x) =
1X
t=0
 
tY
s=1
(xs)
!
u

f(xt)  xt+1   (N   1) (f(kt)  kt+1)
N

;
and
(x0;k) =

x2 (k0) s.t 0  xt+1  f(xt)  (N   1) (f(kt)  kt+1)
N
;8t  0

:
V (x0;k) = max fU (x0;k;x) j x 2 (x0;k)g :
Let ' denote the solution to the 45 dened as below,
'(x0;k) = argmax fU (x0;k;x) j x 2 (x0;k)g ;
Proposition 4.3 The solution to the 45, '(x0; k); is upper semi continuous in k and
it is ordered so that if y; y^ 2 '(x0; k) either y  y^ or y  y^:
Proof. Let fkng be a sequence that converges to k and let yn 2 '(x0; kn); 8n: We
can assume that it converges to some y 2 (x0;k) : Take any z 2 (x0;k) : One can
nd a sequence fzng included in (x0;k) for every n large enough, which converges
to z. We have:
8n; V (x0;kn) = U (x0;kn;yn)  U (x0;kn; zn)
72
By letting n go to innity, we have
V (x0;k) = U (x0;k;y)  U (x0;k; z)
so that y 2 '(x0; k):
Let y; y^ 2 '(x0; k):
Case 1: Suppose that y1 = y^1: Since the y and y^ satisfy 44;we can conclude that
yt = y^t;8t:
Case 2: Let y1 6= y^1: Without loss of generality, consider the case of y1 > y^1:
Dene the correspondance,
(x j k) = argmax
0yf(x)  (N 1)(f(kt) kt+1)
N
264 u

f(x)  y   (N 1)(f(kt) kt+1)
N

+(y)V (y; kt+1; kt+2::)
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By the monotonicity theorem (Amir, 1996), (x j k) is increasing in x. So that
y2 > y^2: Then by induction, y > y^:
Proposition 4.4 Let f() be concave. Then there exists an OLNE.
Proof. We rst show that  (k0) is compact and convex set. Take any two ele-
ments k; k0 in  (k0) so that f(kt)  kt+1 and f(k0t)  k0t+1 for all t: We have to
show that
 
kt+1 + (1  ) k0t+1
  f(kt + (1  ) k0t) where  2 [0; 1] : For t = 0,
it is trivially satised. For t 6= 0; this inequality follows from the concavity of pro-
duction function. Continuity of f assures the compactness of  (k0) under product
topology. By the proposition 4.3, '(x0; k) is uppersemi continuous and ordered so
that it admits an upper semi continuous selection, '(x0; k) = max'(x0; k) where
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'(x0; k) 2 '(x0; k): Moreover ' is closed as it is uppersemicontinuous and closed val-
ued. From the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg Theorem5, we can conclude that '(k) has a
xed point in  (k0) which coincide with the symmetric OLNE of the game.
We get the following equation satised by the stationary symmetric OLNE
u0

f (k)  k
N

=  (k) u0

f (k)  k
N

f 0(k)+
0 (k)u

f(k) k
N

1   (k) (46)
Schumacher (2011) shows that if the discount rate is endogeneized via a state
variable, the domain of the felicity function should be constrained to a positive do-
main. In a negative domain, a higher stock of capital would have a negative impact
on overall welfare. However, under our parameterization, even with a negative felic-
ity function constrained to a negative domain, a higher stock of capital will have a
positive impact on welfare. Indeed, our discount factor attributed to the utility of
consumption at period t increases with the level of capital stock, as in Becker and
Mulligan (1997) and Stern (2006). Note that when the period utility is homegenous
in consumption, it can be recast as
H(k) =
u0 (f (k)  k) (1   (k) f 0(k)) (1   (k))
0 (k)u (f (k)  k) =
1
N
(47)
If H(k) is monotone then there is a unique stationary symmetric OLNE and the
equation 46 is su¢ cient. In that case, the following proposition states that the com-
parative statics of statioanary symmetric OLNE depends on if the returns are bounded
or unbounded from below.
5Kakutani - Fan - Glicksberg: Let K be a nonempty, compact, convex subset of locally convex
Hausdorf space, and let the correspondance ' : K  K have closed graph and nonempty convex
values. Then the set of xed points of ' is compact and nonempty.
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Proposition 4.5 Let us assume that the period utility is homogenous in consumption
and H(k) is monotone. If the return is bounded (unbounded) from below, then the
unique stationary symmetric OLNE increases (decreases) with the number of players.
Proof. If the return is bounded (unbounded) from below we have H (0) = +1
(H (0) =  1) : Since H (k) is monotone and there exist unique stationary symmetric
OLNE, 47 is a su¢ cient condition. Then the result follows from the fact that 1
N
is
decreasing in N .
Corollary 4.1 Let us assume that the period utility is homogenous in consumption
and H(k) is monotone. If the return is bounded (unbounded) from below, then the
unique stationary symmetric OLNE is higher (lower) than the unique collusive equi-
librium.
Proof. Under collusive equilibrium we have H (k) = 1 > 1
N
: The result is a direct
corollary to 4.5.
If H(k) is not monotone, there might be multiple solution to (46). Since equation
46 is just a necessary condition, they may not constitute a steady state open loop
Nash equilibrium(see Dockner and Nishimura, 2001). This moves the concern on the
number of solutions to the stationary Euler equations and among those that will be
induced by a steady state open loop Nash equilibrium. The analysis of the solutions
to the stationary Euler equations and the determination of which of these solutions
constitute a steady-state can not be carried out without specifying the forms of the
utility, discount and the production functions.
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4.5 Numerical Analysis
In what follows, our analysis will be based on the functional forms specied in ac-
cordance with Stern (2006). The utility, production and the discount functions are
specied as
u(c) =
c1 
1   ;
f(k) = Ak + (1  )k;
(k) =    e (k+)" ;
where 0 < fA; g; 0 < ; ; " < 1; and 0 < e " <  < 1:
In accordance with these, we utilize the following set of fairly standard coe¢ cients
as our benchmark parameterization:
A = 0:75;  = 0:4;  = 0:03;  = 1:5;  = 0:95;  = 4:5;  = 1:5;  = 2:5; " = 0:99
under which the maximum sustainable level of capital stock turns out to be A(k) =
maxf(k0;
 
kg; where
 
k is 213:747:
As it is shown by Erol et. al. (2011) under standard preferences and technology,
endogenous discounting creates threshold dynamics First we borrow an example from
Erol et .al. (2011) showing that endogenous discounting creates threshold dynamics
such that every equilibrium that starts to the left of the threshold level converges to
low steady state and every equilibrium that starts to the right of the threshold level
converges to the high steady state.
76
4.5.1 Emergence of Threshold Dynamics under Collusive Equilibria
There exist three solutions to (39): kl = 0:5953, km = 2:9155; and kh = 8:4913. In
order to determine which of these are actually the optimal steady states, we analyze
the optimal policy using the Bellman operator. Here kl and kh are stable optimal
steady states and there exists a genuine critical point at kc  5:5846 which is not an
unstable steady state. Therefore, for any initial stock lower than kc, the economy will
face a development trap, enforcing convergence to a very low capital level kl. On the
other hand, for any initial capital level higher than kc, the optimal path will converge
to kh. However, if an economy starts at kc; an indeterminacy will emerge. Hence
even optimally managed renewable resources are sensitive to initial conditions under
standard preferences and technology.
OLNE di¤ers from cooperative solution as it is not e¢ cient. We will see that it
di¤ers from the cooperative solution also in terms of equilibrium dynamics.
4.5.2 Equilibrium Dynamics under OLNE
Comparison with Collusive Problem
The open loop information structure can remove indeterminacy that we may face
under collusive equilibrium and be a source of multiplicity despite the uniqueness we
may face under collusive equilibrium.
Case 4.1 Open Loop information structure removing indeterminacy
Consider now the case with 2 agents. Under the benchmark parameter values,
there exists a unique solution of the stationary state Euler equation (46): (x) =
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(8:53449) :Open Loop information structure remove indeterminacy that we face under
collusive problem.
Case 4.2 Open Loop information structure as a source of multiplicity
As we have already underlined, in a single agent optimal growth framework, the
capital dependent time preference rate generates a critical point. In the vicinity of
this critical point, small di¤erences lead to permanent di¤erences in the optimal path.
Since this result heavily depends on the value of ; we would like to deviate from the
benchmark to explore how the Open Loop information structure modies the results
under collusive problem. Hence, we assign a lower value to ,  = 4. We show that
Open Loop information structure creates multiplicity while the capital accumulation
path for the collusive problem converges to a unique globally stable steady state.
Indeed, there exist three solutions to the stationary state Euler equation (39) of the
single agent optimal growth problem: xl = 0:3708, xm = 4:0061; and xh = 8:4315.
However, among these three solutions, only xl turns out to be an optimal steady
state implying a global convergence result. When we consider the noncooperative
problem under open loop information setting we nd xl = 0:953053, xm = 2:30966;
and xh = 8:50707 as the solutions of the stationary state Euler equations where xl
and xh are the steady state OLNE.
Comparative Statics with respect to the Number of Players
Recall that the optimal capital path in collusive problem is independent of the
number of players. Under open loop information setting, we show numerically that
proposition 4.5 is valid for the extremal equilibria in the case of multiple steady states.
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 = 4:5  = 4
Number of Players  = 1:5  = 0:5  = 1:5  = 0:5
1
0:59531
8:49127 8:64795
0:37076
8:68861
2
8:53449 8:61245
0:95305
8:50707 8:63394
3
8:54821 8:60014 8:53019 8:61457
4
8:55496 8:59389 8:54142 8:60465
100
8:57396 8:57552 8:57261 8:57513
1000
8:57466 8:57482 8:57375 8:57400
Table 1: How does the steady state OLNE change with the number of players?
Remark 4.1 Note that number of player may change the equilibrium dynamics. For
the case with  = 4 and  = 1:5 we have multiplicity when there is two player and
unique steady state OLNE when there is more than two player.
4.6 Conclusion
In spite of the mathematical convenience that the exogenous time preference bring us,
it is not an innocent assumption. As we summarize below, many results we have under
exogenously discounted dynamic shery models can not be extended to endogenous
discounting case.
 Endogenous discounting creates threshold dynamics so that even optimally man-
aged renewable resources are sensitive to initial conditions under standard pref-
erences and technology.
 OLNE is not e¢ cient. Depending on whether the return is bounded or un-
bounded from below, it may cause overexploitation or underexploitation of the
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resources relative to e¢ cient solution.
 The OLNE di¤ers from the collusive equilibria in terms of not only e¢ ciency
but also equilibrium dynamics. Open loop information structure can remove
indeterminacy that we may face under collusive equilibrium and be a source of
multiplicity despite the uniqueness we may face under collusive equilibrium.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this thesis, we study the existence and qualitative properties of equilibrium dy-
namics under endogenous time preference. In chapter two, we consider future oriented
capital stock people allocate to increase anticipation of future benets. This idea has
been introduced formally by Becker and Mulligan (1997). Stern (2006) adopted this
idea into the optimal growth framework to provide a more exible framework regard-
ing discounting of time. We contribute his e¤orts by focusing on questions that were
left as open and studying how sensitive the equilibrium dynamics are with respect
to the cost of future oriented capital stock. To our knowledge, almost none of the
studies on endogenous time preference consider the strategic interaction among the
agents. In chapter three, we let the discount factor to be increasing in stock of wealth
and show that the strategic complementarity among the agents would be a remedy
of poverty trap. Lastly, we consider socially determined time preference where the
discount factor depends on aggregate resources in the economy. We show that, unlike
the case under constant discounting, open loop Nash equilibrium is not e¢ cient and
depending on the return is bounded or unbounded from below, it may result in over
exploitation or under exploitation of the resources relative to e¢ cient solution.
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While considering the strategic interaction we adopt the noncooperative open loop
Nash equilibrium concept, in which players choose their strategies as simple time func-
tions and they are able to commit themselves to time paths as equilibrium strategies.
While open loop information setting provides a base point, the characterization of
the Markov Perfect Nash equilibrium(MPNE) is important to consider the e¤ects of
making use of information. In feedback models, MPNE is subgame perfect which re-
quires that players respond optimally to the realizations of random variables as well
as unexpected deviations.
In feedback models, studies mostly rely on specic functional forms that allow
closed form equilibrium strategies and clear cut comparative statics conclusions. It
is desirable to reduce the present interdependence on specic functional forms. En-
dogenous time preference makes it harder to get close form solutions if it does not
make it impossible. Hence, the existence of and algorithms for feedback equilibrium
is valuable. In basic shery models, for the exogenously xed discount factor, the
existence of stationary symmetric Markovian equilibrium (SSME) has originally pro-
vided by Sundaram (1989) and Amir (1989). Both of the approaches use Schauders
xed point theorem, while the former use topological arguments and the latter use
lattice theoretic ones. Recently, Datta et al.(2009) use partial ordering methods for
characterization of SSME of a nite period game. We will utilize their approach un-
der endogenous time preference and provide a constructive proof for the existence of
a Markov equilibria and a monotonicity of a state trajectory being implied.
There is economic literature on addiction and self-control that draws upon a psy-
chological nding that optimal saving plans for the present self would not be optimal
for the later self. Strotz (1955), by formally modeling this idea, state that an in-
dividual has a myopic tendency to resist delaying consumption in the near future.
Considering the shery problem in chapter four, we can ask what will happen if one
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agent has time inconsistent preferences. Does it cause the other agents with time con-
sistent preferences act like her? In other words, are the time inconsistent preferences
contagious if the property rights are not well dened?
Hopefully, these studies incorporate the insights behind the time preference into
theoretical formulations in a way that will increase the accuracy of predictions while
not losing any other values like tractability and generality.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 3.8
The non-cooperative game (N = f1; 2g;S; fU i : i 2 f1; 2gg) is supermodular if S
is a sublattice of
 Q
i2N Rmi

, U i is supermodular in xi, for any xj and U i has in-
creasing di¤erences in (xi;xj).
i) The lattice S is a subset of R1 and it is a sublattice of it:
ii) Let us start proving that each individual payo¤ function is supermodular in
its own strategy. By denition, a function f is supermodular if and only if
f(x _ y) + f(x ^ y)  f(x) + f(y):
Consider two di¤erent strategies for agent i, xi and x0i who di¤er from each other
at time t and t+ 1 so that t+1x =t+1 x0i = (x
i
t+2; x
i
t+3; :::): Recall that
U (t+1xi j xj) =
1X
=t+1
 
Y
s=t+2
(xis)
!
u
 
gi(xi ; x
j
 )  xi+1

:
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We need to show that:
(x0t
i)u
 
gi(x0t
i; xjt)  x0it+1

+ (x0t
i)(x0it+1)U (t+1x
0
i j xj)
+ (xit)u
 
gi(xit; x
j
t)  xit+1

+ (xit)(x
i
t+1)U (t+1xi j xj)
 (x0ti)u
 
gi(x0t
i; xjt)  xit+1

+ (x0t
i)(xit+1)U (t+1xi j xj)
+ (xit)u
 
gi(xit; x
j
t)  x0it+1

+ (xit)(x
0i
t+1)U (t+1x
0
i j xj)
Since
 
(xit)  (x0ti)

(x0it+1)U (t+1x
0
i j xj)   
(xit)  (x0ti)

(xit+1)U (t+1xi j xj) ;
it is su¢ cient to show that
(x0t
i)u
 
gi(x0t
i; xjt)  x0it+1

+ (xit)u
 
gi(xit; x
j
t)  xit+1
 
(x0t
i)u
 
gi(x0t
i; xjt)  xit+1

+ (xit)u
 
gi(xit; x
j
t)  x0it+1

:
This is equivalent to showing that (xit)u
 
gi(xit; x
j
t)  xit+1

is supermodular in
(xit; x
i
t+1). As (x
i
t)u
 
gi(xit; x
j
t)  xit+1

is di¤erentiable, it holds if
@2(xit)u

gi(xit; x
j
t)  xit+1

@xit@x
i
t+1
 0:
iii) Let us now prove the increasing di¤erences. A function f has increasing
di¤erences if and only if
f(x; t00)  f(x; t0); t00 > t0;
is increasing in x.
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Let xi 2 Bri(xj) so that xit+1 2 i (xit j xj) ;8t: As open-loop strategies are only
dependent on the initial conditions, one can easily write that
xit = 
i
 
i
 
i
 
:::i
 
xi0
 j xj| {z }  it  xi0 j xj ;8t = 1; 2; :::
t  times
Now we x x^j > xj (that is x^
j
t > x
j
t for all t), and consider a best response of
agent i, x^i  fx^itg1t=1 so that x^it+1 2 ^i (x^it j x^j) ;8t: Accordingly,
x^it = ^
i
 
^i
 
^i
 
:::^i
 
xi0
 j x^j| {z }  ^it  xi0 j x^j ;8t = 1; 2; :::
t  times
We have to check whether
U(x^i; x^j)  U(x^i;xj)  U(xi; x^j)  U(xi;xj) (48)
for ^i (x j x^j) > i (x j xj) ;8x. We can substitute U :
1X
t=0
 
tY
s=1
(^is
 
xi0

)
!
[u
 
gi(^it
 
xi0

; x^jt)  ^it+1
 
xi0
  
u
 
gi(^it
 
xi0

; xjt)  ^it+1
 
xi0

] 
1X
t=0
 
tY
s=1
(is
 
xi0

)
!
[u
 
gi(it
 
xi0

; x^jt)  it+1
 
xi0
  
u
 
gi(it
 
xi0

; xjt)  it+1
 
xi0

]:
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Since ^is (x
i
0)  is (xi0) for all s, we have that the above inequality is equivalent to
check whether:
(^it
 
xi0

)u
 
gi(^it
 
xi0

; x^jt)  ^it+1
 
xi0
  
(^it
 
xi0

)u
 
gi(^it
 
xi0

; xjt)  ^it+1
 
xi0
 
(it
 
xi0

)u
 
gi(it
 
xi0

; x^jt)  it+1
 
xi0
  
(it
 
xi0

)u
 
gi(it
 
xi0

; xjt)  it+1
 
xi0

:
We shall proceed by dividing both sides by
 
x^jt   xjt

and taking the limit when 
x^jt   xjt
! 0. We get that (48) holds if and only if
@

(^it (x
i
0))u
 
gi(^it (x
i
0) ; x^
j
t)  ^it+1 (xi0)

@xjt
 
@

(it (x
i
0))u
 
gi(it (x
i
0) ; x
j
t)  it+1 (xi0)

@xjt
 0:
Note that when
 
^i (xi0)  i (xi0)
 ! 0; then  ^is (xi0)  is (xi0) ! 0; 8s: Dividing
both sides by
 
^it (x
i
0)  it (xi0)

and taking the limit when
 
^it (x
i
0)  it (xi0)
 ! 0;
we obtain that
@2

(it (x
i
0))u
 
gi(it (x
i
0) ; x
j
t)  it+1 (xi0)

@ (it (x
i
0)) @x
j
t
 0:
Put di¤erently, in terms of period utilities,
@2

(xt
i)u
 
gi(xt
i; xt
j)  xit+1

@xit@x
j
t
 0;
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together with
@2

(xt
i)u
 
gi(xt
i; xt
j)  xit+1

@xit@x
i
t+1
 0;
ensures the supermodularity of the game. Since S is compact under product topology
and U i is upper semicontinuous in xi on Si (xj) ; the result follows from Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Proposition 3.9
By the same reasoning that we use in the proof of proposition 3.8-(iii), condition
31 assures that for each player, U i has increasing di¤erences in (xi; ) : All the rest
follows from Topkis (1998) Theorem 4.2.2.
Proof of Proposition 3.10
We proceed in three steps. First, we show that the game (N;S; fU i : i 2 Ng), only
admits symmetric and antisymmetric steady states. Then, we prove that antisym-
metric steady states are linearly ordered with the highest and the lowest symmetric
steady states. Finally, we prove that our game only admits symmetric steady state
open loop Nash equilibria.
Lemma 7.1 If (x; x) is a steady state open loop Nash equilibrium of the game
(N;S; fU i : i 2 Ng), then (x; x) is also a steady state open loop Nash equilibrium.
Proof. If (x; x) is a steady state open loop Nash equilibrium of the game given by
(N;S; fU i : i 2 Ng), then (x; x) satises 32 for both agents. (x; x) is also a steady
state since for each i; j 2 N; i 6= j; gi(xi; xj) = gj(xj; xi) and @gi
@xi
= @g
j
@xj
:
Lemma 7.1 shows that the set of steady states only contains symmetric and anti-
symmetric steady states. As the next lemma shows, the antisymmetric steady states
are linearly ordered with the highest and the lowest symmetric steady states.
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Lemma 7.2 Let (x^; x^) and (x; x) denote the highest and the lowest symmetric steady
steady state open loop Nash equilibria of the supermodular game (N;S; fU i : i 2 Ng).
If there exists an asymmetric steady state open loop Nash equilibrium, say (x; x)
with x 6= x; then (x; x)  (x; x)  (x^; x^) :
Proof. Let x < x; without loss of generality. Let x0 be such that gi (x0;x0)
= min fgi (x; x) ; gj (x; x)g for i 2 f1; 2g :
Assume now on the contrary that x < x: We have, by construction,
gi (x0;x0) < g
i (x; x) < gi (x; x) :
Let  = (gi (x0;x0) ; gj (x0;x0)) and  = (gi (x; x) ; gj (x; x)) ; where  <  : Con-
sider the corresponding supermodular games   () and   () : By Proposition 3.9; the
greatest and the least equilibrium of the game are increasing in  on T; i.e. steady
state levels that the greatest and the least open loop Nash equilibrium of the game
converge to will be higher for  : Since   () is a symmetric supermodular game, the
least equilibrium converge to a symmetric steady state, i.e. x  x;leading to a
contradiction.. The case of x  x^ can be shown similarly.
Let us prove now that any steady state open loop Nash equilibrium of our game
is indeed symmetric:
Let (x^; x^) and (x; x) denote the highest and the lowest symmetric steady state
open loop equilibria of the game, respectively. First and as a corollary to Lemma
7.2, if the highest and the lowest symmetric steady states coincide, i.e., x^ = x; there
does not exist any asymmetric stationary state open loop equilibria of the game. Now
consider the case where x^ 6= x and assume that (x; x) is an asymmetric stationary
state open loop Nash equilibrium with x < x without loss of generality. Then, by
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Lemma 7.1, (x; x) constitutes an asymmetric steady state open loop Nash equilib-
rium as well. Consider now the game (N;S; fU i : i 2 Ng) under the following three
initial endowments: (x; x); (x; x) and
 
x+x
2
; x
+x
2

: Recall that the game with a
symmetric initial endowment turns out to be symmetric supermodular so that due to
the monotonicity of the best replies, the greatest and the least equilibrium converge
to the highest and the lowest symmetric steady state, respectively. Accordingly, as-
sume that the equilibrium of the symmetric supermodular game that starts with the
initial endowment of
 
x+x
2
; x
+x
2

converges to the highest symmetric steady state
(x^; x^) in the long run, without loss of generality. In comparison with the asymmetric
stationary state open loop equilibrium (x; x); the open loop Nash equilibrium of the
game that emanates from
 
x+x
2
; x
+x
2

and converging to (x^; x^) in the long run re-
veals that an increase in agents own initial capital stock and a decrease in the rivals
implies the convergence of the agents stock towards a higher steady state. This then
implies that the equilibrium of the supermodular game that emanates from (x; x)
has to monotonically converge to the highest steady state (x^; x^) as well. However,
this contradicts with the fact that (x; x) has to be a steady state open loop Nash
equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3.11
Let x0 be such that
gi (x0;x0) = min

f (xL) ;
f (2xoL)
2

; i 2 f1; 2g ;
and consider the corresponding symmetric supermodular game. Let

xj0;xj
	
=
(x0; 0; 0::; 0; :::) : Note that Bri (xj) coincides with the single agent optimal growth
problem for the given initial capital stock, f 1 (gi (x0;x0)) : As xL is stable from left, 9
xi 2 Bri (xj) such that xi ! xL: Since xL is the lowest steady state and the optimal
policy correspondence of a single agent optimal growth problem is ordered (see Erol
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et al., 2011), we can conclude that xi is the least element of the best response corre-
spondence. Let (x; x) constitute the least open loop Nash equilibrium of the game,
i.e. x 2 Bri (x) and x 2 Brj (x) : Note that the supermodular game structure
implies that the least and the greatest elements of the best response correspondence
are increasing in opponents strategy. Having xj < x by construction, we conclude
that x  xi and xoL  xL:
For the second case, let x0 be such that
gi (x0;x0) = max

f (2xoL)
2
; f (xH)

; i 2 f1; 2g ;
and consider the corresponding symmetric supermodular game. Let

xj0;xj
	
=
(x0; 0; 0::; 0; :::) : Br
i (xj) coincides with the single agent optimal growth problem
for given initial capital stock, f 1 (gi (x0;x0)) : As xH is stable from the right, 9
xi 2 Bri (xj) such that xi ! xH : By the same reasoning as above, xi is the high-
est element of the Bri (xj). Having xj < x by construction, we get x  xi and
xoL  xH :
Proof of Corollary 3.1
As proven in Proposition 3.10, there only exist symmetric steady state open loop
Nash equlibria. At any steady state open loop Nash equilibrium (x; x), agentspayo¤
can be recast as
U (x j x) = u (g (x; x)  x) 1
1  (x) :
Note that if
@
@x

u (g(x; x)  x)
1  (x)

> 0;
then U (x^ j x^)  U (x j x)  U (x j x) holds where at least one of the inequalities will
be strict.
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